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ABSTRACT
As documented by a two-volume report, criteria to determine
the probability of aircraft structural failure were established
according to the Quantitative Structural Design Criteria by
Statistical Methods, the QSDC Procedure. This criteria method
was applied to the design of the space shuttle during this con-
tract. An Applications Guide was developed to demonstrate the
utilization of the QSDC Procedure, with examples of the applica-
tion to a hypothetical space shuttle illustrating the application
to specific design problems. Discussions of the basic parameters
of the QSDC Procedure: the Limit and Omega Conditions, and the
strength scatter, have been included. Available data pertinent
to the estimation of the strength scatter have also been included,
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1. INTRODUCTION
Engineers have long recognized a need for reliability-based
structural design criteria. Present design methods have not
produced structures that are consistently reliable simply be-
cause there is no means to consider reliability as a design
factor. On the other hand, most of the proposed reliability
methods are not practical in their application as design methods.
The reliability methods previously proposed have the common fault
of assuming that the strength distribution of the structure (the
normal variation of nominally identical structures of a design)
and the loads to which the structure is subjected are known. That
is, they do not consider the possibility of an error in the anal-
ysis such that the actual strength distribution is different than
the predicted strength distribution. The neglect of the error-
disclosing ability of a test and the necessity of a proof of
compliance procedure have also been common. The design procedure
which can encompass both reliability and the practical aspects
of the Present System will be the optimum design procedure. A
design procedure which blends the aspects of reliability and
practicality into a consistent, useful design procedure has been
proposed in the "Quantitative Structural Design Criteria by Sta-
tistical Methods," the QSDC Procedure (Reference 1).
As a design procedure that can blend reliability with the
practical aspects of structural design criteria, the QSDC Pro-
cedure must define design criteria in terms of reliability and
then translate them into design requirements that can be met
in a practical design procedure. The QSDC accomplishes this
by specifying design requirements that interface with the present
design procedures. That is, deterministic strength requirements
are specified and must be demonstrated by the appropriate proof
of compliance procedure. However, the original development of
the QSDC Procedure as presented in AFFDL-TR-67-107 discussed the
basic concepts without developing explicit methodology and the
necessary data base required for its application. In fulfillment
of this need, the. Applications Guide was developed.
The Applications Guide was developed as a handbook that
structural design engineers could use in implementing the
QSDC Procedure as a structural design criteria method. The
QSDC Procedure is presented as a stepwise procedure in which
the design conditions, design factors, and design loads (strength
requirements) are specified. Proof of Design is provided by
appropriate analyses and tests such as those described in NASA
SP-8057 (Reference 2). Static and fatigue strength requirements
are discussed in Section 2. Thermal design problems, although
not discussed here, are outlined in Volume 1. The important
parameters in the QSDC Procedure are the strength scatter coef-
ficient and the design and test factor of safety. These param-
eters and their relation are discussed in Section 3. Also, data
on the strength scatter coefficient is presented in Section 3.
Examples illustrating the choice of design conditions and design
factors can be found in Section 4. These examples are represen-
tative of the Phase B configuration of the Space Shuttle. Al-
though care was taken so that the examples would be independent
of any particular structure, specific design problems were con-
sidered to demonstrate that the QSDC Procedure is specific in its
application although it is general in its nature.
2. QSDC METHODOLOGY
2.1 Intent of the QSDC Procedure
2.1.1 General
In the implementation of a new design procedure such
as the QSDC Procedure, it is often helpful to describe the in-
tent of the procedure. If the new procedure does not cover a
specific design problem, the engineer can, with an understanding
of the intent of the procedure, arrive at a solution to that
particular problem.
First, the basic intent of any structural design pro-
cedure should be to ensure that the structure is of sufficient
strength and reliability to perform its intended function in
its particular environment for the planned lifetime of the vehi-
cle. This goal is achieved through the QSDC Procedure by es-
tablishing a design methodology which will result in structural
systems that will rarely fail during operations. The QSDC solu-
tion is designed to take explicit and active measures to prevent
structural failures for all service conditions ranging in severity
from zero to infinity. To prevent failures in all possible en-
vironmental situations, the design spectrum is subdivided into
three separate operational regions as shown in Appendix A (Figure
2, page A-6). Failure is then prevented in each region. These
three regions - safe, overload, and gross overload - are delimited
by two deterministically defined operational conditions: the
Limit Condition and the Omega Condition.
These two conditions are intended to represent inter-
faces between the structural and non-structural systems. The de-
termination of the Limit and Omega Conditions is described in
detail in Section 2.2.2. The intent behind the choice of the
two conditions is summarized below.
The Limit Condition is intended to be the upper boundary
of normal and expected operations of the vehicle and its non-
structural subsystems. This qualitative definition is quantitized
in the QSDC Procedure as discussed in Section 2.2.2. For instance,
the Limit Condition might be defined as a 2a or a one-in-one-hundred
condition. For all practical purposes, the Limit Condition in
the QSDC Procedure is intended to be the same as the Limit Con-
dition in the Present System (represented by Reference 2). Since
a Limit Condition is normal and expected, it should be permissi-
ble to operate at all operational levels up to and including
the Limit Condition. Typically, operational limitations and plac-
ards are related to Limit Conditions.
Since the Limit Condition is a permissible condition,
it should be structurally "safe" to operate up to the Limit
Condition. Thus, the Limit Condition has the characteristic of
an interface between the structural and non-structural systems.
The non-structural system may be operated up to Limit with every
expectation that structural survival is "certain" and will re-
sult in operations that are "safe." If a structural failure
should occur at an operational condition below Limit, respon-
sibility for the failure must be attributed to the structural
system.
The Omega Condition is intended to represent the most
extreme or severe operational condition for which some degree of
structural capability is required. Operations beyond Limit must
be considered as overload situations imposed on the structural
system by the non-structural system. The Omega Condition is in-
tended to establish a bound on the overload from non-structural
systems that the structural system must tolerate and survive.
Any operation beyond the bound established by the Omega Condition
is considered to be a gross overload and is not expected to be
survivable.
Although the Omega terminology is new, the concept of
providing structural capability beyond the Limit Condition is not.
The 1.5 Factor of Safety that is typical in the Present System
provides some overload capability although the amount varies from
one design to the next. The QSDC Procedure differs from the
Present System only by making the overload requirement explicit.
The QSDC Procedure rationalizes the overload requirement by link-
ing it to a structural reliability requirement. This rationali-
zation of the overload requirement can be understood and accepted
if it is realized that the average structure in a fleet must
survive (to a first approximation) a flight condition that occurs
once in the lifetimes of a 1000 vehicles if a 0.999* reliability
is to be attained. Conversely, it is not necessary to provide
more strength than enough to survive an operational condition
which is the complement of the desired structural reliability.
Thus, the intent in establishing the Omega Condition
in the QSDC Procedure is to define an upper bound on operational
mode for which some capability of surviving structurally is re-
quired. Since the structure is not required to survive beyond
the Omega Condition, the vehicle must not exceed this condition
too often or the structure may fail so often that the structural
reliability goal cannot be met.
The requirements for the structural system are related
to the Limit and Omega Conditions in the QSDC Procedure. As
noted in the discussion of the Limit Condition, the QSDC Procedure
intent is to define requirements that will result in a structural
system which is "safe" if the Limit Condition is not exceeded.
Reference 1 quantitatively defines a structure which is "safe"
in the region up to the Limit Condition as one which has no more
than one percent of its total failure distribution below the
* Typical numbers. Specific values depend on vehicle mission
as discussed in Section 2.2.2.
Limit Condition. This means that, for any specified reliability
goal, the contribution to the failure rate will be insignificant
in the "safe" region. There should be no more than one failure
in the "safe" region below the Limit Condition for every 99 fail-
ures in the overload regions above Limit.
The desired high degree of certainty of survival in
the "safe" region is obtained in the QSDC Procedure by designing
and testing to the Limit Loads multiplied by a factor of safety
known as the Limit Design and Test Factor of Safety (LTFS). This
is essentially the same procedure as that in the Present System.
The difference is that the LTFS in the QSDC Procedure is not
a fixed value such as 1.5 but a variable dependent on (1) the
reliability goal as defined by mission, (2) the strength scatter,
and (3) the number of strength tests of the particular structural
configuration (see Figure 6). It is the intent of the QSDC Pro-
cedure that the factor of safety (LTFS on Figure 6) be the mini-
mum value required to attain a "safe" structure. Since the
overload capability is provided separately, the requirement for
"safe" structure up to the Limit Condition can be established
without consideration of overload capability and total probability
of failure.
References 3 and 4 together with Section 2.1.2 and
Appendix B of this report discuss the possibility of errors in
the strength analysis. A basic premise in the QSDC Procedure
is that the frequency and magnitude of analytical errors are
major contributors to structural unreliability. The desired
level of structural reliability is regained by strength tests
which disclose any errors with a high degree of certainty. The
error disclosure results in rejection of the unreliable design
followed by redesign and retest until the test requirements are
satisfied.
The LTFS of Figure 6 is intended to define design and
test loads incremented upward from Limit Loads sufficiently
so that a service vehicle will "never" fail at the unfactored
Limit Load after being tested to the higher design loads factored
upward by the LTFS. Reference 1 describes how the LTFS is cal-
culated. Oversimplified, it is determined by the range between
the high side and the low side of the strength distribution of
the particular structural system. There is a finite possibility
that an understrength design might pass the static test because
the test article is randomly on the high side of the actual mean
strength. This situation is sometimes called "random success."
Such an understrength design would be approved for production,
not knowing that the design is understrength and that the mean
strength is below the test strength. Some of the flight articles
would inevitably be below the mean strength which is already
below the test strength. To attain a "safe" design, one with
a very low probability of failure at Limit, the chance must be
minimized of a random success on the high side of the true strength
distribution resulting in the qualification of an understrength
structural design which is followed by a random low side failure
of one of the operational vehicles. The larger the strength
scatter, the larger the range between the high side and the low
side at a given probability level. This is the underlying reason
why the LTFS must increase as the strength scatter increases
as shown on Figure 6.
Designing and testing as necessary to attain a struc-
tural configuration which is "safe" up to the Limit Condition
will not necessarily result in the desired total probability of
failure and overall structural reliability. The total proba-
bility of failure is related to the frequency and magnitude with
which the Limit Condition is exceeded operationally. Reference
1 establishes that in most situations structures which are de-
signed and tested to the loads corresponding to the Omega Condi-
tion will intrinsically have a probability of failure less than
the probability of exceedance of the Omega Condition. However,
when the strength scatter is large, the structural reliability
starts dropping if the test load is the same as the load associ-
ated with the Omega Condition. As shown on Figure 7 a separate
factor of safety (OTFS) must be applied to the Omega Loads
when the strength scatter is large.
If the intent of the QSDC Procedure is accomplished,
the resulting structural system will satisfactorily perform
its function as a vehicle subsystem. The structure will be "safe"
and "never" fail in the operational region up to the Limit Con-
dition. Since this region is by designation the region of normal
and expected operations, almost all operational situations oc-
curring in actual usage will be in this "safe" region.
The intent of the QSDC Procedure is that a negligible
proportion of the total probability of failure distribution will
occur in the region below the Limit Condition. Therefore, the
major contribution to the total probability of failure will result
from operations in the overload and gross overload regions (see
Figures 2 and 4 of Appendix A). Regardless of the calculated
probability of failure based on the predicted probability of ex-
ceedance of the Limit Condition, any failure beyond the Limit
Condition is the result of an operational overload. The first
and best line of defense against such, failures is to conduct
service operations of the vehicle and its non-structural subsys-
tems so that the designated Limit Condition will not be exceeded.
If the effort to prevent overload operations is successful, the
Limit Condition requirement, designing for Limit Loads multiplied
by the LTFS, will provide for "safe" operations.
If the Limit Condition is penetrated and overload oper-
ations do occur, the second line of defense is the overload capa-
bility of the structural system provided by the Omega Condition
requirement. The intent of the QSDC Procedure is to define Omega
requirements which result in a structural system with "most" of
the operational vehicles capable of surviving a penetration of the
overload region between the Limit and the Omega Conditions. "Most"
is used to define the requirement since penetration into the over-
load region will be rare, and if "most" vehicles survive the pene-
tration, failure will be very rare in this region.
If the penetration of a Limit Condition continues
beyond the Omega Condition, survival of the structure is not
likely. It is the intent of the QSDC Procedure that prevention
of structural failure due to a gross overload caused by opera-
tion beyond the Omega Condition should not be the responsibility
of the structural system. Prevention of structural failure in
the gross overload region beyond Omega is the responsibility of
the non-structural system interfacing with the structural system.
If operations can be conducted so that the Omega Condition is
never exceeded or, at worst, so that the frequency or probability
of exceedance is no more than originally predicted when the Omega
Condition was established, then the probability of failure and
structural reliability will be as originally predicted.
2.1.2 Implementation of Intent
The intent described in the previous section must be
carried out by specific actions if the "no failure" goal is to
be attained while minimizing the structural weight and cost
necessary to achieve the goal.
The first step in implementing the intent of the QSDC
Procedure is to establish a deterministic interface between the
structural and nonstructural systems. This interface is defined
by the dual level of operational conditions. The determination
of the dual (Limit and Omega) conditions is discussed in Section
2.2.2. Prediction of the lifetime operational spectra on which
the determination of the Limit/Omega Condition should be based
cannot be expected to be perfectly accurate. Therefore, the
QSDC procedure is intended to translate the definition of the
Limit/Omega Conditions into operational limitations and perfor-
mance requirements for nonstructural systems. Those responsible
for the design and operation of any nonstructural system inter-
facing with the structural system must be appraised of the mag-
nitude .of the Limit Condition. They, in turn, must be respon-
sible for not exceeding the Limit Condition. When exceedances
do occur, it is the intent of the QSDC Procedure that there be
an advance commitment that each instance of exceedance of a Limit
Condition be investigated and corrective action taken to prevent
future exceedance.* It should never be forgotten that structural
failure can be caused, as shown on Figure 1 of Appendix A, by
excessively severe operations resulting in overloads. Control of
operations is equally important with control of strength in pre-
venting structural failures.
Naturally, a system would be required to monitor the vehicle
operation so that exceedances of Limit could be detected.
The intent of "no failure at Limit" is achieved by
designing and testing (in most cases) to loads which are higher
than those at the Limit Condition. The increment beyond Limit
provides a reserve against understrength so that any design which
is tested to the specified loads will "never" fail in operations
at Limit. The required increment is defined in the QSDC Proce-
dure as a Limit Design and Test Factor of Safety (LTFS). It is
explicitly tailored to be the minimum value commensurate with the
structural reliability goal for the particular mission. As
shown on Figure 6, an LTFS less than 1.5 may be justified in
many cases but larger values may be necessary in other cases.
In the past, the conventional 1.5 F.S. has provided
this necessary reserve against understrength generally with good
success. However, it has done so indirectly, not as the result
of a specific requirement. In some instances the 1.5 factor has
been more than necessary and in other cases it has not been
enough to provide the desired reliability. In such instances,
past procedures have proscribed such situations. For example,
long slender columns are not permitted in aerospace structures
according to MIL-HDBK-5A; pressure vessels usually require a
factor of safety greater than 1.5; and brittle materials such
as ceramics and extremely high heat treatments are not used
in primary structures.
If the reserve against understrengths were to be ig-
nored, as some investigators have proposed, the result is very
likely to be an unsafe structure. For example, with no errors
in the analysis and fabrication, the specification of a factor
of safety of 1.0 would, by present methods, result in a failure
rate of one per hundred vehicles at or below Limit. Since the
present method matches the "A" allowable (99 percent exceed) of
the material strength with the required strength (the load
at Limit), the one-in-one-hundred strength that did not exceed
the "A" allowable would certainly fail below Limit. Some in-
vestigators have not considered the effect of the factor of
safety in light of the reserve against this understrength. They
have claimed that the factor of safety is necessary to compensate
for errors. However, in the previous discussion where no errors
are considered, the result is still an unsafe structure when
a 1.0 factor of safety is used. Therefore, the factor of safety
is used to account for another phenomenon: that of the normal
variation or scatter in the strength of the material.
Unfortunately, the problem of designing a structure to
be "safe" at Limit is more serious than indicated in the preceding
paragraph. Reference 1 points out the difficulty of achieving a
"safe at Limit" design when the possibility of an analytical error
in the strength analysis is considered. .If the Jablecki/Chenoweth
data (References 3 and 29) are accepted as valid, approximately one
in ten of the analytically qualified designs would fail at Limit
(assuming a 1.5 F.S.).
The possibility of these failures can be demonstrated by
Figure 1 where the strengths of an inventory of 20 new designs
are shown. The strength distribution of each design is shown as
a percentage of the Limit Load. These values for the strength dis-
tributions are based on the Jablecki/Chenoweth data and represent
the initial, untested strength distributions of the design. In
keeping with the one-in-ten design failures below Limit, 2 of
the 20 design strength distributions, E and K, have their mean
strength at or below the Limit Strength. Similarly, the 12
strength distributions whose mean strengths are below 150 percent
of the Limit Load level (designs B, D, E, G, I, K, L, N, P, Q,
S, and T) represent the 50 percent of the structural designs
that will fail below the Design Load. To substantiate the per-
centages used, reference is made to Figure B-2 where the Jablecki/
Chenoweth data are presented. Specific percentages of the design
load have been assigned to specific designs for illustrative
purposes only. It is pointed out that the underlying assumption
of the QSDC Procedure is that the actual location of a design
strength distribution is never known with certainty. For example,
when a particular system such as the space shuttle is considered,
the strength distribution of the design may be that of design A;
but it could be like the strength distribution of design N, or
worse yet, like the strength distribution of design K. Given a
single strength test, it cannot be said with certainty that the
strength distribution of the space shuttle is that of design A;
instead, in the QSDC Procedure the statement is allowed that
the strength distribution of the space shuttle is probably that of
design A. The probability that the strength distribution is below
the intended location must be considered if a "safe" structure is
to be designed.
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Figure 1. Typical Locations of the Initial Strength
Distributions for Jablecki Data
The assumption that space shuttle designs will be as
error-prone as the aircraft designs resulting in the Jablecki/
Chenoweth data is argumentative. However, available evidence
indicates that the assumption is valid. In any event, it is
a basic assumption of the QSDC procedure that the strength anal-
ysis alone will not result in the high degree of certainty neces-
sary to be sure that a new design will be "safe" at the Limit
Condition. References 1 and 5 state the need for designing and
testing a design to loads greater than the loads associated with
the Limit Condition. The magnitude of the factor depends on
the level of structural reliability desired, the coefficient
of strength scatter, ys (see Section 2), and the number of strength
tests to be conducted to qualify the design. Figure 6 shows
the recommended value of this factor of safety. It is called
the Limit Design and Test Factor of Safety (LTFS) to distinguish
it from the well-known 1.5 factor of safety.
References 1 and 5 discuss in detail the rationale
for the LTFS values shown on Figure 6. Oversimplified, the LTFS
is associated with the certainty that the strength qualifica-
tion test will reveal a deficient design by a failure below the
required test load. The certainty of rejection is related to
the "random success" phenomena. This means simply that the test
article may be stronger than the average strength of nominally
identical articles. Therefore, an understrength design may pass
the qualification test. The possibility that operational vehicles
may fail at Limit after successfully passing a test to some higher
load depends on the range in strength from the high side to the
low side of the distribution of nominally identical structures.
Thus, the larger this range in strength, as defined by YS> tne
larger the factor of safety necessary to assure "no failure" at
Limit. Consequently, the factor of safety is a function of the
scatter in strength as shown in Figure 6.
The degree of certainty required so that the new design
will be safe at the Limit Condition can be insured by performing
a strength test to the design load. The disclosure of the under-
strength designs (B, D, E, I, K, L, N, P, S, and T) is shown in
Figure 2. The short vertical line placed on the strength distri-
bution represents the failing strength of the strength test arti-
cle. When the strength of the test article is surpassed in the
test, the article fails and the design is considered unacceptable
(marked by an X on Figure 2). The structure must be redesigned
and retested until the test article passes the test to the design
load; i.e., the test article strength is greater than the design
load. When this situation occurs, the design is qualified (the
design strength distribution is crosshatched in the figure to repre-
sent the qualified design).
The anomalies that can occur in the strength test are
illustrated by designs C, G, and Q. For design C, the strength
distribution of the design is satisfactory before the test is
conducted, but the strength of the test article is randomly on
10
the low side of the strength distribution. As a result, the test
article fails at less than the Design Load and hence the design
fails to qualify. (This phenomenon is known as random failure.)
The design must be strengthened as a result of the test failure
thus strengthening an already satisfactory design. The disad-
vantage of the random failure is only in the added program cost
for the redesign, retest, and additional weight. Design G repre-
sents the opposite phenomenon: that of random success. The
strength distribution of the design is less than that intended,
but the test article is randomly on the high side of the strength
distribution. Thus, a design that is slightly understrength
passes the strength test and is qualified. However, the Refer-
ence 1 data shows that minor understrengths such as in design G
do not result in a significant loss in structural reliability.
SYSTEM
INTENDED
DESIGN
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1
J
K
L
M
N
0
P
Q
R
S
T
LOCATION OF STRENGTH DISTRIBUTION AFTER STATIC TEST
A
A
A
JL
**<*•-A
fr
I
Aj
A
A
A
A '
A
-fA
i
I
A
A
&ii.JL&
».
1.J «
f A • |A
SO 100
PERCENT LIMIT LOAD
ISO
Figure 2. Typical Locations of the Strength Distributions
After the Static Test to the Design Load
Design Q is a repetition of the random success pheno-
menon. The only difference is that the degree of the design
understrength is much greater. The design Q is included so that
the effect testing has on the certainty of having a "safe" de-
sign at the Limit Condition can be demonstrated by a simple
example. It is assumed that the factor of safety is 1.5 and
that the structural configuration results in a typical strength
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scatter (coefficient of strength variation equal to 0.05). If it
is assumed that an error in the analysis results in a structure
whose mean strength is midway between the Limit and Ultimate Loads
(Reference 1 points out that this midpoint location of the mean
strength is the worst possible case). A successful test to 150
percent of Limit Load would occur only once in 31,500 such situa-
tions.* This l-in-31,500 design, which happened to pass the test
to Ultimate Load, would qualify the design and make it acceptable
for production. Based on the location of its mean strength, the
probability of a service vehicle failing at Limit would also be
l-in-31,500. As a result, the probability of failing at Limit after
a successful test to 150 percent Limit is the product of the two
probabilities or approximately one in one billion. In the QSDC
Procedure this very low probability is considered equivalent to
f
'no" failure. It appears that the rationale outlined above explains
why strength tests to 150 percent of Limit Load have resulted
in very reliable structural systems in the past.
The intent of the QSDC Procedure as described has been
limited to structural reliability as defined by the prevention
of catastrophic rupture or collapse of the structural system.
Yield in the structure in the region up to Limit has traditionally
been considered to be unacceptable. However, yielding in the
structural system does not normally cause loss of the vehicle
or loss of life. Generally, yield failures result in economic
consequences only. The cost reflects the loss of vehicle util-
ity during a mission or the cost of repairing or replacing a
yielded component. Therefore, the certainty of surviving up
to the Limit Condition without yield may be much less than the
certainty of surviving Limit without catastrophic failure.
If a structural reliability goal based on survival
without yield can be defined, the yield factor of safety can be
developed in the same manner as the LTFS for ultimate or catas-
trophic failure as defined on Figure 6. The determination of
specific values for the yield factor of safety is beyond the scope
of the present study. However, it appears reasonable to assume
that the reliability against the yield mode of failure could be
about one-half that reflected by the "high-risk" curve of Figure
6. The strength scatter used to define the yield factor of
safety would, of course, be the scatter in yield strength. On
the basis of this crude analysis, the 1.1 factor of safety some-
times specified for yield would be quite adequate unless the
scatter in yield strength is quite large. The 1.0 yield factor
of safety may result in a moderately high probability of accepting
a design that will experience some yield failure during operations.
For instance, if the actual mean strength happens to coincide
with the Limit Load, there will be a 50 percent probability that
the test article will pass the test for yield strength. If such
a design is accepted, there will be a 50 percent probability that
the operational vehicles will experience yield at Limit. Thus,
* Gaussian distribution assumed with mean at 125 percent Limit.
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a yield test to a 1.0 factor may result in a 25 percent proba-
bility of operational yield failure after successfully qualifying
the design by demonstrating with one test article that there
is no yield at Limit. It is suggested that a trade study be
conducted on specific designs to determine the break-even yield
factor of safety, balancing the cost of designing and testing
to higher yield factors against the increased probability of
yield failures on operational vehicles associated with lower
yield factors. In the absence of such a trade study, a 1.1 yield
factor of safety is recommended.
Implementation of the intent of the QSDC procedure
thus far has been in the context of static or time-independent
strength situations. This has traditionally been the prime
strength requirement. After satisfaction of the static strength
requirement, the usual procedure is to examine the structural
configuration to determine whether it satisfies the requirement's
for time-dependent strength situations. Historically, the first
time-dependent strength situation to be considered was fatigue.
The intent of the QSDC Procedure is the same in the fatigue sit-
uation as in the static situation where the Limit Condition is
the static strength requirement, and the Limit Usage Spectrum
defines the time-dependent strength requirement. Any cumulative
vehicle usage which can be defined as normal and expected must
have "no" failure so long as the vehicle does not exceed the de-
fined Limit Usage Spectrum or the defined Limit Condition during
the defined Service Li-fe .
An Omega Usage Spectrum defines a usage whose proba-
bility of exceedance is greater than the complement of the
desired structural reliability. An Omega Usage Spectrum may
result either from excessively severe operations during the
expected or specified Service Life or from the specified normal
usage carried on beyond the specified Service Life to an unex-
pectedly long life, the Omega Service Life. "Most" of the
operational structural systems should be capable of surviving
an Omega Usage Spectrum.
The intent of the QSDC Procedure in time-dependent
strength situations is the same whether the time dependency is
the result of fatigue, thermal, corrosion, or other similar con-
ditions. The cumulative usage history of the vehicle is the
interface between the structural system and the non-structural
systems. The local environments are derivatives of the vehicle
usage.
The intent of the QSDC Procedure in time-dependent ,
situations is presumably the same as that of the Present System.
Both procedures aim at defining a structural system which will
not experience structural failures during the life of the vehicle.
However, there is a fundamental difference in the achievement of
this goal. The QSDC Procedure examines the degraded or residual
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strength during the vehicle lifetime and determines how this af-
fects survival of Limit and Omega Conditions. The Present Sys-
tem effectively ignores the strength during the Service Life
and concentrates on surviving a truncated loading spectrum to
some multiple of the specified service life. If this approach
produces a reliable structure during the service life, it is
somewhat fortuitous because the relationship between the test
life and the actual strength during the service life is not
considered. In the QSDC Procedure the strength during the service
life is considered directly. In particular, the problem of re-
jecting a design which has inadequate strength during the service
life is a prime consideration.
2.1.3 Comparison of QSDC Procedure with the Present System
The QSDC Procedure, although presented as a new design
procedure, is in reality a modification of the Present System.
In particular, it is a modification of the choice of the design
conditions. The implementation of these conditions, their use
in the design of the actual piece of hardware, is the same as
that in the Present System. Despite their differences, several
comparisons and contrasts may help the user to better understand
the new procedure.
First, the Limit Condition of the QSDC Procedure is es-
sentially the same as that of the Present System. However, the
definition of the Limit Condition in the QSDC Procedure is based
on a probability of exceedance value, whereas the definition of
the Limit Condition in the Present System is deterministically
based on previous experience or the engineer's judgement, or both.
The objective of either definition is to make the Limit Condition
the upper boundary of normal and expected operations.
Second, the Omega Condition of the QSDC Procedure is
used to fulfill a single part of the dual role of the Present
System's Ultimate Load. The part that the Omega Condition ful-
fills is to define the required overload capability of the struc-
ture. By virtue of the fixed 1.5 factor of safety, the ultimate
load is higher than the Limit Load associated with the Limit
Condition. The vehicle overload capability that this provides
is indirect and not really a requirement that must be fulfilled.
As a result, the degree of vehicle overload capability is not
known. On the other hand, by specifying a discrete Omega Condi-
tion, the degree of overload capability that the design will
have is known. This overload capability is insured by the use
of an Omega Design and Test Factor of Safety (OTFS). In most
applications, this factor equals 1.0, but if the scatter factor
or the reliability required are large, the OTFS is increased
according to the curves of Figure 7.
Third, the QSDC Procedure defines requirements intended
explicitly to result in a structural system which is "safe" up
to the Limit Condition. The Present System satisfies this "safe"
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requirement indirectly and with varying degrees of certainty.
Situations where the system might not have the desired degree of
reliability at Limit have been recognized through experience and
handled by empirical requirements.
Fourth, the loads associated with the Omega Condition
are not factorially related to the loads associated with the
Limit Condition. In some special situations the Limit and Omega
Loads may be identical, for example, when the vacuum in a tank
approaches absolute zero at the Limit Condition. The vacuum
in the Omega Condition will also approach zero. It should be
clearly understood that the Limit and Omega Loads are determined
directly from the Limit and Omega Conditions. To emphasize this
relationship, it is possible for the wing bending moment in the
Omega Condition to be less than the bending moment in the Limit
Condition. This situation could result from nonlinearities in
the wing load distribution associated with partial stall conditions
The similarity between the QSDC Procedure and the
Present System is emphasized on Table I. The major procedural
differences are the addition of Omega Conditions to the design
requirements and the adoption of a factor of safety that varies
from one design to another. A detailed explanation of each
step on Table I is presented in Section 2.2., Static Design
Methodology.
TABLE I. COMPARISON OF STATIC DESIGN METHODOLOGY OF
PRESENT SYSTEM AND QSDC PROCEDURE
I. PREDICT LIFETIME OPERATIONAL CONDITION SPECTRA
2. DETERMINE
3. DETERMINE
L||||T
LM
'
T
LIMIT ANDOMEGA
CONDITIONS.
LOADS.
A rOMPUTF LIMIT AND ULTIMATEDrS|GN LOADS4. COMPUTE
 L|M|T AND QMEGA DESI6N LOADS.
5. DESIGN STRUCTURE FOR DESIGN LOADS.
6. TEST STRUCTURE FOR DESIGN LOADS.
7. MONITOR LIFETIME OPERATIONAL HISTORY.
8. REDESIGN AND RETROFIT.
X WHERE THE TOP LINE REFERS TO THE PRESENT
SYSTEM DESIGN METHODOLOGY AND THE BOTTOM LINE
REFERS TO THE QSDC PROCEDURE DESIGN
METHODOLOGY
15
2.2 Static Design Methodology
The QSDC Procedure satisfies the intention of insuring "that
the structure is of sufficient strength...to perform its intended
function..." through its static design methodology. The static
design methodology may be summarized as a series of eight steps,
listed in Table II, that describe the choice and implementation
of the Limit and Omega Conditions mentioned in Section 2.2.2.
Steps 1 and 2 define the Limit and Omega Conditions for design
purposes. Steps 3 through 6 are concerned with the analytical
determination of the design loads, the strength of the structure,
and the strength tests necessary to qualify the design. Steps
7 and 8, although not directly concerned with the initial design
and fabrication of the vehicle, are concerned with the effective-
ness of the design in operation.
TABLE II. STATIC DESIGN METHODOLOGY OF QSDC PROCEDURE
I. PREDICT LIFETIME OPERATIONAL CONDITION SPECTRA
2. DETERMINE LIMIT AND OMEGA CONDITIONS.
3. DETERMINE LIMIT AND OMEGA LOADS.
4. COMPUTE LIMIT AND OMEGA DESIGN LOADS.
5. DESIGN STRUCTURE FOR DESIGN LOADS.
6. TEST STRUCTURE FOR DESIGN LOADS.
7. MONITOR LIFETIME OPERATIONAL HISTORY.
8. REDESIGN AND RETROFIT.
2.2.1 Predict Lifetime Operational Condition Spectra
Aerospace systems are designed to fulfill particular
program objectives. These objectives are generally embodied in
a "design mission" and alternate design missions. As soon as the
"design mission" is defined, a corresponding set of operational
conditions are described (as in Reference 2) as phenomena, or
events, that may occur at a point in time or interval thereof
and are expressed in terms of physical units such as pressure,
temperature, load, acceleration, attitude, rate, and flux. For
example, the design mission of the Space Shuttle might be simply
stated as placing 65,000 pounds of payload in orbit and re-entering
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the atmosphere aerodynamically. Some hypothetical operational
conditions consistent with this mission might be a nominal thrust
level of 800,000 pounds, a longitudinal acceleration of 35.4 feet
per second squared to 218 feet per second squared and an entry
velocity of 16000 feet per second at 200,000 feet. The role
of the responsible engineer will be to define and predict these
and other operational conditions.
The engineer must not only predict the range of opera-
tional conditions, but he must also determine the probability of
exceeding each level of the condition in the range. As an example,
consider the operational condition of booster thrust. The entire
range of booster thrust could theoretically be zero pounds-force
to an infinity of pounds-force. Defining this range in terms
of probability would then permit considering a much smaller
range. Assuming that it has been determined by one of the
following methods, a thrust of 1 x 10° pounds will be exceeded
once in one hundred vehicle lifetimes as shown on Figure 3.
Similarly a thrust of 1.2 x 10° pounds-force will have been
determined as exceeded once in ten thousand vehicle lifetimes,
also shown on the figure. This process of assigning a proba-
bility of exceedance to every level is continued until a smooth
curve can be drawn. The assignment of the probability of
exceedance was made on an average vehicle lifetime basis. In
defining the range of operational conditions, this convention
should be adhered to so that the design condition levels used
in the next section will be consistent.
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Methods that can be used to assign the probability
to a given condition level would be as follows: a synthesis
of the condition spectrum from an analysis of the statistics
of past operations with similar vehicles, an analysis of the
operational capabilities of the vehicle and the performance
requirements during each phase of the vehicle life, or good
engineering judgement.
2.2.2 Determine Limit and Omega Conditions
The Limit Condition of the QSDC Procedure is a deter-
ministic value that represents the upper boundary of normal and
expected conditions for a given operational parameter. As a
limit, the condition level used is a placard value that is,
by decree, not to be exceeded. As such, the Limit Condition
provides an administrative criteria when structural failure
and operational control are considered. When structural failure
below the Limit Condition occurs, the controlling agency can
order the structural organization to strengthen the structure.
When exceedances of the Limit Condition occur, the controlling
agency can order the non-structural systems to control the oper-
ations so that future exceedances do not occur. Without a de-
terministic Limit Condition, such decisions cannot be made.
For example, if the Limit Condition were defined in probabilistic
terms, the failure or exceedance could always be attributed to
the random variation. For instance, a structural failure at
90 percent of the usual Limit Condition could be attributed to
a one-in-a-thousand low-strength structure, with the remainder
of the structures predicted to fail above the Limit. Similarly,
one occurrence of an operational condition of 120 percent of
the usual Limit Condition could also be considered a random
event with a one-in-ten-thousand probability but not an unaccep-
table one-in-ten probability. Neither of these statements can
be proved or disproved. The structural failure could not be
categorized as an understrength situation, nor could the opera-
tional condition be categorized as an overload. Therefore,
an administrative decision on whether corrective action was
needed would not be evident. Therefore, no control over the
design could be exercised.
The Omega Condition in the QSDC Procedure is a deter-
ministic value that represents the boundary between what is
considered a minor overload and what is considered a gross over-
load. Its role in the QSDC Procedure is the definition of an
acceptable overload and the absolute boundary of the strength
requirement for the structural system. Basically, there is
no similar condition specified in the Present System, but the
Ultimate Load creates .some overload capability. The Omega Condi-
tion, like the Limit, is deterministic and single valued. Al-
though the difference between an acceptable overload and a gross
overload could encompass a wide range of values, a single value
is again chosen for administrative purposes. As before, specific
actions concerning the structural failure and condition of ex-
ceedances can be taken by the controlling agency. Structural
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failure above the Omega Conditon can be attributed solely to
the gross overload of the structure by the non-structural system.
In the QSDC Procedure, the choice of Limit and Omega
Conditions is made on the basis of the probability of exceedance
of the condition level. Thus, the Limit and Omega Conditions are
two precise points in the spectra defined in Section 2.2.1. The
probabilities at which these two points are defined are themselves
based on the structural reliability goal proposed for the structure
Two specific equations relating the probability of exceedance of
the Limit and Omega Conditions to the S.R. goal are:
CL - c
Cfi = Cn/(PE[Cn] - 1 - SRgoal)
where
CL is the Limit Condition
C^ is the Omega Condition
Cn is the general condition that satisfies
the equations
PE is the probability of exceedance and
SR aoi i-s tne structural reliability goal.
NOTE :
Read the Limit Condition (CL) equals the variable condition
level (Cn) such that the probability of exceeding the variable
condition level ...PE[Cn] equals the square root of the proba-
bility of exceeding the Omega Condition (C^ ) ; also the Omega
Condition equals the variable condition level (Cn) such that the
probability of exceeding the variable condition level equals the
complement of the structural reliability goal.
If all of the operational conditions can be defined in
terms of their probability of exceedance, then the QSDC Procedure
provides a consistent, practical, and reliable method for choos-
ing the Limit and Omega Conditions.
The reliability level used as the basis for the parti-
cular design being considered is a management decision that is
required by the QSDC Procedure. This decision is based on the
mission specified for the vehicle system and the performance re-
quired of the structural system to satisfactorily complete the
vehicle mission. Alternatively, the reliability level can be
defined for each class of vehicle or by risk level, as on. Table
III. Here, a high risk level mission, such as military missions
might describe, would have a structural reliability of 0.99.
Such a low level of reliability is practical because of the high
probability of structural failure due to hostile action and the
extremes of operating conditions that the structure is subjected
to in combat action. A standard risk mission, which has a cor-
responding structural reliability of 0.9999, would be specified
by the typical space operations but could be modified as the
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situation warrants.
 ;Low risk missions that require a structural
reliability of 0.999999 are typified by the commercial, passenger-
carrying flights on commercial airlines. The above three levels
of reliability are proposed because they typify the expected
values of reliability desired. Precise reliability goals of
0.999998, etc., are basically not practical choices because the
exact reliability of any single design can never be known. How-
ever, the reliability can be estimated fairly closely. As a re-
sult, approximate figures can be specified. If the design steps
are followed properly, the reliability that the design will have
should be close to the reliability specified. For example,
if a 0.9999 reliability is specified, the actual reliability
of the structure should be somewhere in the vicinity of 0.9999,
i.e., 0.9995 to 0.99995. This is one reason why the QSDC Pro-
cedure sets reliability goals rather than reliability require-
ments .
TABLE III. STRUCTURAL DESIGN CRITERIA FOR STATIC DESIGN
IN THE QSDC PROCEDURE
RISK
LEVEL
HIGH
STANDARD
LOW
STRUCTURAL
RELIABILITY
GOAL
.99
.9999
.999999
PROBABILITY OF
EXCEEDING LIMIT
CONDITION
.1
.01
.001
PROBABILITY OF
EXCEEDING OMEGA
CONDITION
.01
.0001
.000001
When the structure is critically loaded by a combi-
nation of operational conditions, the combined spectrum should
be considered. The specification of Limit and Omega Conditions
becomes more complex, but the definition remains the same.
Normally, only independent operational conditions are combined;
dependent conditions will need special consideration. Indepen-
dent condition spectra are combined to form Limit and Omega
Condition envelopes. The envelope performs the same role as
the point in the single condition case: that of defining a
distinct boundary. The Limit envelope is defined as the region
of combined conditions less than or equal to the Limit of one
or all conditions. For the two-condition case, the region is
bounded by the points O,LI} L^ + 2, 1*2 °f Figure 4. The Limit
envelope is defined by the area enclosed by lines: OT^ ,
The Omega envelope is defined as the region of combined
conditions less than or equal to the Omega level of one and the
Limit level or less of all the others for each of the conditions
that are combined. For the two-condition case, the two regions
bounded by 0,fi^, tii£, 1^2 anc* °» Ll> fi2C> fi2 are Omega envelopes.
Although the combined Omega Condition ft-^ is not included in
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the Omega envelope, sufficient strength beyond the L^+2 point is
provided when designing for points fi^p and fl2O Tne line £2
is used to approximate this effect. The Omega envelope, there-
fore, is defined by the area bounded by the line segments
M]_ ^1C' MIC ^2C* ^2C ^2* and fi?^ °^ ^~ne fi-Sure'
z
o
o
z
o
o
CONDITION 2
Figure 4. Limit and Omega Envelopes for Combined Conditions
When the operational condition spectra cannot be de-
fined in terms of their probabilities of exceedance, the Limit
and Omega Conditions can be chosen according to engineering judge-
ment. The only requirement is that the definition of the Limit
and Omega Conditions be satisfied by the chosen values. That
is, the Limit Condition should be the upper boundary of normal
and expected operations, and the Omega Condition should be greater
than the worst anticipated overload. A guide that could help
in assigning Omega Conditions would be the malfunctions the
structure is expected to survive. Condition levels that the
malfunctions would produce might be considered as minimum values
for Omega.
2.2.3 Determine Limit and Omega Loads
The Limit and Omega Conditions define the upper bounds
of the condition for two separate requirements. The Limit or
Omega Load is determined as the most critical external load ex-
perienced in the condition up to and including the Limit or the
Omega Condition. This investigation must be carried out with a
particular component in mind. In linear systems, the Limit and
Omega Loads are proportional to the magnitude of the Limit and
Omega Conditions. However, nonlinearities might result from
variations in aerodynamic forces, from the geometry of the struc-
ture, or from thermal effects. For instance, loads in the
diagonal members of a booster engine support structure vary with
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the gimbal angle and peak when the thrust axis parallels the
diagonal member. A typical variation might be as shown on
Figure 5. In this example, choosing the load at the Limit Condi-
tion of gimbal angle would not yield the most critical load.
The peak load would occur at about 50 percent of the Limit Condi-
tion. Hence, there is a need to investigate the entire spectrum
of the conditions to see that the critical loads are found where
nonlinearities might exist. In most cases, however, the Limit
and Omega Conditions produce the critical loads.
10
GIMBAL ANGLE
Figure 5. Hypothetical Load in the Diagonal Members of the
Thrust Structure versus the Gimbal Angle
The external loads are derived from the operating con-
ditions in the standard manner employed by the loads analysts.
This particular part of the design process is not a particular
concern to the QSDC other than the fact that the possibility of
an error in the loads analysis may affect the reliability in
service. Usually, this possible error is disclosed by the flight
loads survey program. See Appendix B for a discussion of the
effect of this error on the reliability in service.
The Limit and Omega Loads for the combined condition
are defined as the highest loads that can be achieved within or
on the Limit and Omega envelopes. Obviously, this is stretching
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the one-dimensional definition to two or n dimensions. As in
the single condition, a full analysis of the loads for the spec-
trum of each condition combined with the other conditions would
be required. This would yield the particular combinations of
conditions that create critical external loads on the structure.
The critical loads corresponding to the Limit envelope are known
as the Limit Loads, and the critical loads corresponding to the
Omega envelope are known as the Omega Loads.
2.2.4 Compute Design Loads
The Design Load for the Limit Condition and the Design
Load for the Omega Condition are the loads to which the structure
is sized. See Section 2.2.5. The Design Loads are the factored
Limit and Omega Loads where the factor is the design and test
factor of safety (TFS). Therefore, given the Limit and Omega Loads
(Section 2.2.3), the Design Loads are determined by the TFS.
The design and test factor of safety (TFS) is a con-
tinuous function based on the following parameters: the scatter
in structural strengths, the number of qualification tests, and
the structural reliability desired. This factor of safety func-
tion is a variable, as a result, in contrast with the fixed
values of safety factors used in the Present System. Without
going into the details of the TFS functions (a discussion can be
found in Section 3:2), Figures 6 and 7 represent the design and
test factor of safety for the Limit and Omega Loads, respectively.
The characteristic of the Limit Design and Test Factor of Safety
(LTFS) is that it is more dependent on the strength scatter co-
efficient than the Omega Design and Test Factor of Safety (OTFS).
For low strength scatters and all reliability levels, the OTFS
is equal to 1.0. However, as the scatter increases beyond 0.06
it takes on values above 1.0 for the low risk design. For the
standard risk design, the OTFS becomes greater than 1.0 when
strength scatter coefficients of 0.12 are reached. The OTFS
is a safety factor function performing the same type of role
as the LTFS: that of insuring sufficient strength at the Omega
Condition.
The computation of the Design Loads could be shown
by the following example. Consider the Space Shuttle booster as
the structure being designed. Assuming that the structure dis-
plays a scatter in strength of 12 percent (ys - 0.06), the LTFS
and OTFS are 1.41 and 1.0, respectively, if the standard relia-
bility goal is used. These factors are applied to the Limit
and Omega Loads of the condition being considered. Choosing the
condition of thrust for this example, the Limit and Omega Loads*
can be found from Figure 3 to be 1.0 x 10^ pounds and 1.2 x 10&
pounds, respectively. Finally, the Design Loads are computed as
the product of the loads and their corresponding factor of
safety:
* The condition and load for thrust are numerically the same.
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Limit Load x LTFS
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1.41 x 106 pounds
Omega Load x OTFS
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Figure 6. Limit Design and Test Factor of Safety
(from Reference 1)
At the preliminary level of design, the user should not be
overly concerned with the value of the predicted strength scatter.
Reference 1 documents the fact that relatively large differences
between the predicted and actual strength scatter will result in
relatively small differences in structural reliability. As a re-
sult, the methods for estimating the strength scatter need not be
extremely accurate, but they should assist the engineer in making
a good approximation to the actual strength scatter. Methods for
estimating the YS f°r *-he design are presented in Section 3.3,
and some appropriate data is presented in Section 3.4. These
methods should result in strength scatters close enough to the
actual so that the LTFS and OTFS chosen will produce the level
of reliability desired. When the methods for predicting the com-
ponent strength scatter are used, the strength scatter applied to
the design of the structure is the largest scatter of the several
components. The reason for this is that the qualification test
will not disclose an understrength of the component with the
large scatter unless the Design Load for that component is applied
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to it. Unfortunately, this Design Load usually cannot be applied
to one element of the design without applying it to all of the
elements. Thus, the component with the largest YS becomes the
controlling component in the choice of LTFS and OTFS and, hence,
in the choice of the Design Load.
To illustrate the application of this principle, one
simplified example is presented. In the example there are two
members representing the multi-element structure of the wing
of a shuttle or similar vehicle. Maneuvering flight in the at-
mosphere is the condition considered. A Limit Load Factor of
3.0 is assumed. The two-member structure consists of a lower
skin in tension and an upper spar cap in compression. The
strength scatter for the skin is 0.04 and that for the spar cap
is 0.06. Since the critical ys is 0.06, the LTFS is 1.41 (from
Figure 6). The Design Load for the Limit Condition is the pro-
duct of the Limit Load and the LTFS (3.0 x 1.41), namely 4.23,
where the load and condition level are referred to as load
factors.
If the Omega Condition corresponds to a load factor of
4.0 and the OTFS read from Figure 7 is 1.0, the Design Load for
the Omega Condition is 1.0 x 4.0, or 4.0. It is a basic part of
the QSDC methodology that the Limit and Omega Conditions and
the corresponding Design Loads should be determined separately
and carried through the analysis and test separately unless it
is obvious that one or the other is the more critical. In this
example, it is apparent that the Limit Design Load is the more
critical.
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.24 .28
Figure 7 Omega Design and Test Factor of Safety (from
Reference 1)
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2.2.5 Design Structure for Design Loads
From this step forward the QSDC Procedure is essen-
tially the same as that for the Present System. For all practical
purposes, the designers, stress analysts, and test engineers will
function as they always have. The structure is designed or sized
at the component or element level by matching the material allow-
able or component strength to the critical Design Load for the
condition under consideration. In other words, the structure must
be sized so that the margins of safety are positive, just as re-
quired for designs in the Present System.
If both the wing skin and spar cap of the previous exam-
ple are designed with zero or positive margins, the strength dis-
tributions of the components would be as shown on Figure 8. The
LTFS of the wing spar cap would define the design and test load
because of the larger strength scatter. Because the ys °f the
wing skin is less in the example, the "safe" load can be closer
to the design and test load as shown in Figure 8.
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In some structural systems it might be possible to test
the skin separately to a lower load than that for the spar cap.
Such tests must be made with caution. If separate tests and test
articles are established, there is danger that the test articles
may not be representative of the production vehicles because
errors in the drawings and specifications of the production arti-
cles may not be duplicated in the test article. Also, a test of
anything less than the full-scale structure with all of its com-
ponents may not disclose errors in the internal distribution of
the external loads to the various subcomponents.
2.2.6 Test Structure to Design Loads
After the complete structure has been sized, as indi-
cated in Section 2.2.5, the strength is verified by static test-
ing the full scale structure to the Design Loads. This test
discloses strength errors such as errors in the analytically de-
rived internal load distributions, errors in the dimensions
and call-outs on drawings, and in the fabrication, and just plain
oversights in the analysis. It is assumed that there is "no
error" in the external loads of the static test, because there
is no way to verify them at the time. The verification of the
external loads comes later from the results of a flight loads
program. If the flight loads program results are found to be
inconsistent (higher) than the strength tests requirements, the
structure must be retested and, if necessary, redesigned to
pass the new strength requirement that is derived from the higher
flight loads data. A discussion of this part of the design
cycle can be found in Appendix B.
Besides disclosing errors, the static test provides
an absolute, positive criterion by which it can be said that
the strength requirements are met. Instead of trying to accom-
plish the nearly impossible task of demonstrating a reliability
such as 0.9999, the strength test represents a deterministic re-
quirement that is administrable. The structure must survive in
the static test to the design load without failure. Failure to
survive the static test means that the structure is understrength
and must be redesigned and retested. If the structure sustains
the design load, the design is adequate. The design could,
therefore, be put in the production phase.
Alternatives to static testing the full-scale structure
to the design load would include the following:
1) High FS Design. A decision could be made not
to static test at all, but to design to a
higher factor of safety. This is common in
civil engineering in bridge design where the
articles are one of a kind. The bridge struc-
tures are designed to a requirement approxi-
mating a factor of safety of 4. Similarly,
there has been thought expressed in the aero-
space industry that a factor of safety of
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about 3 should be applied to non-tested
aerospace structures. Applying the com-
puter program of Reference 1 to the situ-
ation of no static test and a design factor
of safety of 3.0, the computer reliability
is a little less than 0.999 (about 0.9986)
for most values of strength scatter. How-
ever, a factor of safety of 7.6 would be
necessary to obtain the probability of
failure of 0.000001 at Limit that is con-
sistent with the "standard" reliability
goal of 0.9999. Thus, depending on the
reliability desired for the particular de-
sign, the decision not to static test could
greatly affect the design. The advantages
of not statically testing the structure are
that the costs associated with static testing
are eliminated and there are no schedule de-
lays that would occur if the structure were
tested and failed. The disadvantage of not
static testing the full-scale structure is
that there is no way to disclose the possi-
ble errors in strength. If the structure
is understrength, the cost of redesign and
retrofitting the service vehicle (after a
costly operational failure) would greatly
outweigh the cost of testing and disclosing
the understrength design. The use of large
factors of safety, however, does not exclude
the possibility of grossly understrength de-
signs. For example, a decimal point error
could result in a design which is one-tenth
of its intended strength. There is no guar-
antee against such an eventuality and if it
did occur even the 7.6 factor of safety
mentioned above would be insufficient.
2) Proof Testing. By proof testing the structure
up to the Limit Load levels, the structural
adequacy of an individual structure for op-
erations up to the Limit Condition can be
demonstrated. This test will reject struc-
tures that are so grossly understrength that
they would fail below Limit. The advantages
of proof testing is that it can disclose
fabrication and maintenance errors. The dis-
advantages of this type of testing are that
design errors are not detected and the reli-
ability of the structure is not demonstrated.
Furthermore, no capability in strength beyond
the Limit Load is guaranteed. Reference 1
shows that failures due to overloads beyond
the Limit Condition are more likely than
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understrength failures below the Limit
Condition. The proof tests alone without
a design qualification test is generally
insufficient to establish a high level
of structural reliability.
3) Coupon Testing. This form of testing has
been used to produce statistical data
quickly and inexpensively for materials
and environments that would be appropri-
ate for the structure. Unfortunately,
this testing method does not disclose
errors that can occur in the actual full-
scale structure.
4) Component Testing. This form of testing
can disclose many of the same type of de-
sign errors that a full-scale static test
can disclose. However, the component test
will not reveal problem areas due to un-
expected interactions between components
changing the internal load distribution.
Furthermore, component tests may not dis-
close assembly errors such as misaligned
load paths. Another reason that component
tests cannot assure the same degree of re-
liability as a full-scale test is that the
component test article is likely to be fab-
ricated from a different set of drawings
than those used for the production vehicles.
This introduces the possibility of a dis-
crepancy between the two. Such errors
could invalidate the component test.
5) Reduced Scale Model. The reduced scale
model test has several drawbacks that ex-
clude it from strong consideration. First,
as a qualification test, the duplication of
full-scale workmanship such as tolerances
and variations in standard materials cannot
be duplicated sufficiently. Second, errors
may occur in either the model or full-scale
drawings that could make the reduced-scale
static strength test misleading.
6) Multiple Full-Scale Tests. This method lies
at the other extreme from the no-test approach,
Here, the advantages are more certainty of
error disclosure and lower design factors of
safety. These advantages are offset by the
increased cost of testing and greater like-
lihood of schedule delays. The unique ad-
vantage of the QSDC Procedure is that the
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2.2.7
advantages can be quantified and used to
make tradeoffs against the cost increases
and schedule delays that are possible.
Monitor Lifetime Operational History
The purpose of monitoring the lifetime operational
history is to validate the choice of Limit and Omega Condi-
tions. Also, the loads associated with the Limit and Omega
Conditions can be validated through a Flight Loads Program.
The Limit Loads may be measured directly, since the flight
test article can be operated up to the Limit Conditions and
readings of the loads can be taken from it.
Determination of the Omega load and verification of
the choice of the Omega Condition will depend on the extrapola-
tion of the available data. For example, the load spectrum de-
veloped in Section 2.2.1 may predict that 80 percent of Limit is
exceeded 200 times during a lifetime of 5000 hours (per Figure
9). After 500 hours, or one-tenth of the vehicle lifetime, the
80 percent Limit value should be exceeded by only ten percent of
the total number of exceedances or 20 times on the average. Par-
ticular vehicles may only exceed it 14 or 15 times while others
may have exceeded it 25 or 26 times by the end of 500 hours.
Nevertheless, the overall average should be 20.
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Generally, if the frequency of occurrence of the con-
ditions below the maximum operational value experienced are less
than the predicted values, then the actual Omega Condition is
likely to be less than that predicted. This would mean that the
Omega Condition used in the design was actually more severe than
necessary and that the structure was conservatively designed.
If on the other hand, the data on condition magni-
tudes below the maximum operational value experienced are re-
corded more frequently than the predicted value, say 60 ex-
ceedances in 500 hours, instead of the 20'predicted, it can
be presumed that the entire spectrum is greater and-that the
Omega Condition will occur more frequently than predicted.
Finally, the decision can be reached that the choice of the
Omega Condition was insufficient and that the structure was
not conservatively designed.
If the flight loads monitoring of aerospace vehicles
were continued throughout the vehicles lifetime, warning systems,
like the one developed in Reference 30, could be used. In brief,
the warning system can be based on the number of exceedances of
a given condition as in Figure 10. In order to accumulate enough
exceedances for a statistically significant value, the given
condition should be some percentage of the Limit, say 80 percent.
This figure can be adjusted upwards as the number of hours of
flight time increases. For instance, above 2000 hours, the
given condition could be 90 percent Limit; and above 4000 hours,
the given condition could be 95 percent Limit.
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The warning system, as part of a computerized moni-
toring system, prints out warning statements for excessive ex-
ceedances and excessive exceedance rates of the given condition.
Whenever the number of exceedances crosses the warning line (for
a specific number of flight hours), the warning system is trig-
gered. Whenever the number of exceedances cross the re-set line
in the positive direction, the program sets this exceedance as
the first exceedance at the beginning of a coarser increment of
flight hours. The purpose of the re-set function is to detect
high exceedance rates after a long period of satisfactory service.
Higher exceedance rates might be due to a change in the use.of
the vehicle, i.e., new mission requirements.
2.2.8 Redesign.and Retrofit
The last step in the QSDC Procedure is the same as in
the Present System. If a failure occurs at anytime during the
service life of the vehicle, a decision must be made as to the
cause of the failure and the required corrective action. If it
is determined that the usage has been more severe than predicted
so that the structure is overloaded, the problem can be solved by
reducing the severity of the operational usage. If this action
is not feasible, new Limit and Omega Conditions must be defined
and the design process recycled. If the decision is made that
the usage and loads are consistent with predicted values, the
understrength must be corrected and appropriate retrofits developed
and installed.
2.3 Time-Dependent (Fatigue) Situations
2.3.1 Intent
The intent of the QSDC Procedure as described in
Section 2.1 is defined largely in terms of static or time-inde-
pendent strength situations. At the end of Section 2.1.2, time-
dependent strength situations are discussed briefly. It is
noted that "the intent of the QSDC Procedure is the same in the
fatigue situation as in the static situation." Specifically,
the structural system should be "safe" for all operations up to
the Limit Conditions and "most" of the structural systems should
have overload capability to survive operations beyond the Limit
Conditions up to the designated Omega Condition. It should be
kept firmly in mind that no structure ever fails in fatigue be-
cause a certain number of load cycles have been imposed on the
system or because a certain number of flight hours have elapsed.
A failure occurs when the structural resistance to load (i.e.,
strength) at a given moment is less than the load at that moment.
Fatigue life, as it is ordinarily defined, has nothing directly
to do with the mechanistic aspects of structural failure.
The situation is illustrated in Figure 11. Two typical
time-dependent residual strength distributions versus time are
shown. What might be considered the distribution for a "good"
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design is described by curves A and B. A "bad" design is des-
cribed by curves C and D. If the various individual vehicles in
a fleet could be removed from service and static tested, the
curves A and B might represent an envelope of the residual
strengths so determined. If the operational loading environ-
ment is simulated in test by the truncated load spectrum that
is used in most fatigue tests, the test article will eventually
fail at the maximum load in the truncated spectrum or at some
lesser load. Since the number of occurrences increases rapidly
as the load goes down, the minimum load at failure is not likely
to be much lower than the maximum. Thus, the range of possible
loads at test failure is rather small as shown on Figure 11.
The time difference between the minimum and maximum test life prob
ably is larger than shown on Figure 11. This cannot be proved
at this time since there is a lack of data to define the true
scatter in life for typical structural assemblies. However, it
appears that the maximum life is usually at least two to four
times the minimum life rather than the 1.5 ratio shown.
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Figure 11. Time Dependency of the Fleet Strength Distribution
The residual strength distribution of the "good" design
on Figure 11 portrays a situation that is likely to be marginally
acceptable. If the lower boundary (99-percent-exceed) begins to
move down from the Omega Load Level, the failure, rate begins to
increase. If the structure should be designed and tested to
Omega Load in order to attain the desired static structural relia-
bility, any decrease in residual strength below the Omega Load
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will result in less than the desired reliability. With a small
strength degradation at the end of the service life, the change
in failure rate and numbers of failures would not be obvious.
All of the additional failures would occur in the region desig-
nated as "Probable Service Failures." These failures would be
the result of the small fraction of the fleet vehicles which
experience a gross penetration of the Limit Condition. The total
number of failures would not be much above the tolerable level,
but the rate of failure (number of failures per hour or 100
hours) would be significantly higher. It is stated in Reference
1 (Volume III, page 87) that a 10 percent degradation in re-
sidual strength at the end of service life would result in an
increase in failure rate by a factor of 10,000. Since the choice
of the Omega Condition and its relation to the static strength
represents the minimum acceptable for the desired level of struc-
tural reliability, it can be understood why the degradation
shown on Figure 11 is considered to be marginally acceptable.
This concept of a marginally acceptable time-dependent
strength distribution does not seem to be consistent with the
picture of the fatigue failure problem as envisioned by most
engineers. The conventional concept of a fatigue problem is a
sudden failure at a relatively low load, typically at or below
the Limit Load. The "bad" design, described by curves C and D
of Figure 11, is more representative of this definition of what
happens when there is a fatigue failure problem. In this group
of vehicles from the "bad" design, the strength of an individual
vehicle would drop so fast that the probability of experiencing
a load between Limit and Omega during the short time period
of the strength drop would be quite small. The probability
of experiencing extreme overloads during a full lifetime is
rather small and the probability during a small fraction of
a lifetime becomes vanishingly small. As a result, the fatigue
failure for a "bad" design is most likely to occur at a load
considerably below Limit. This, presumably, is the basis for
the usual concept of when and at what load fatigue failures occur.
The location of test failure is likely to be within
the region of probable service failures as shown on Figure 11.
The region of test failure should be somewhat smaller than the
region of service failures. It would be extremely difficult
to detect any difference'in the mode and time of test failure
and the mode and time of service failure. This result reinforces
the concept of fatigue failure occurring at relatively low loads
and at about the same number of cycles in service as in test.
This is the same concept of fatigue life that has been associated
with constant-amplitude testing since the beginning of engineering
studies of the fatigue problem.
The problem with conventional fatigue analysis and
testing of the life in a random load environment is that it does
not recognize that structural failures may occur in the region
above Limit Load due to a time-dependent loss of Residual Strength,
34
The closer the design comes to being a "good" design the more
likely the failures are to be in the high region associated with
the distribution AB rather than the low region associated with
distribution CD. Another part of the problem is that errors
in fatigue analysis may occur as frequently or more frequently
than they occur in static analysis. The Jablecki data discussed
in Section 2.1.2 and the added discussion in Appendix B show
the frequency of analytical error in static design. Figure
2 and the associated discussion point out how the appropriate
static test can reject the under-designed systems with a high
degree of certainty. The fatigue test must perform the same
function as the static test as shown on Figure 2. The fatigue
test must reject any unsatisfactory design with a high degree
of certainty.
It is the intent of the QSDC Procedure to develop
methodology which will lead to an analytical solution recog-
nizing the interaction between a random load spectrum with
occasional overloads in a fleet of vehicles and the distribu-
tion of residual strength during the service life of those
vehicles. Even more important, the QSDC Procedure extends the
concept of error disclosure from the static to the fatigue sit-
uation. The test requirement is intended to establish test
conditions that will reject all designs which do not meet the
QSDC standards for a minimal loss in Residual Strength during
the service lifetime.
2.3.2 Implementation of Intent
The implementation of the intent of the QSDC Procedure
in time-dependent (Fatigue) situations starts from the same base
as in the static design situation. If the intent of the QSDC
Procedure is implemented properly, the resulting structural
system will satisfactorily perform its function as a vehicle
subsystem. The structure will be "safe" and "never" fail in
the operational region up to the Limit Condition, and "most" of
the structures will survive penetration into the overload region
between the Limit and Omega Conditions.
In the context of the fatigue situation, the Limit
Condition is represented by a Limit spectrum, a static Limit
Condition (load factor or other parameter), and a Limit Service
Life. The Limit Spectrum is a load spectrum whose probability
of exceedance is no greater than the probability of exceeding
the Limit Condition shown on Table III. The Limit Condition
has the same value as defined in Section 2.2.2. The Limit Service
Life is defined as the number of hours (or flights) that are
expected before operations are terminated. Since each of these
factors is normal and expected and permissible, any vehicle
operated within bounds of these parameters should be "safe"
and "never" fail.
To complete the implementation, Omega values must
be established for the same three functions as for the Limit
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Condition. The Omega load factor, velocity, or other single
parameter is already defined in Section 2.2.2. The Omega
Spectrum is like the Limit Spectrum but more severe with a
probability of exceedance no greater than the probability of
exceeding the Omega Condition shown on Table III. The Omega
Service Life is the maximum life to which any vehicle would
ever be operated. "Most" of the vehicles should survive oper-
ations to any one of the three Omega parameters provided the
other two do not exceed Limit. This is analagous to the static
situation discussed in Section 2.2.2 and illustrated by Figure
4. Satisfaction of the Limit and Omega requirements in the
fatigue situation is not as straightforward as in the static
situation as discussed in Section 2.2. The principal obstacle
is that analytical techniques for predicting the lifetime distri-
bution of Residual Strength are not well developed. However,
it should be recognized that present methodology, utilizing
Miner's Fraction to predict life and validating that prediction
by testing to a multiple of the specified service life using
a truncated load spectrum, does not solve the problem directly,
either. What success has been achieved with the present approach
has been due to the indirect relation between the life distri-
bution of test failures and the probable distribution of service
failures as shown on Figure 11. Only when the resulting strength
approximates curve AB on Figure 11 will the design be considered
as being "good." Since the residual strength is not determined
or even calculated directly, there is no guarantee that a 2X or
4X "life" will result in the required high level of strength
during the specified service life. The high incidence of fatigue
failures in aircraft operations in recent years does not foster
great confidence that the desired results are being achieved
by present methods. It is suggested that the hardware contractor
for the space shuttle be required to define how he plans to
develop a satisfactory lifetime Residual Strength for the shut-
tle or other space vehicles.
In Reference 1 (Volume II, Section 2.4) one approach
to the direct solution of the fatigue reliability problem is pre-
sented. An assumption is made that the relationship between
hours in service life and residual strength is defined by the
relationship
Ultimate Strength
lQge Residual Strength
where T is the number of operational hours and K is a constant
dependent on the structural configuration and loading history.
This relationship permits the calculation of the structural re-
liability resulting from designing and testing to various multi-
ples of the specified service life. Figure 12 shows the life
multiple required as a function of the number of tests. The
procedure is very analagous to that described for the static
situation in Sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.6. In both the static and
fatigue cases, passing the prescribed test insures that "bad"
designs will be rejected with a high degree of certainty. The
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"good" designs that pass the test will have a high strength
initially as shown on Figure 2 and will retain that strength
during the service lifetime as shown on Figure 11.
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Figure 12. Structural Reliability of the Design for Various
Numbers of Fatigue Tests and Multiples of the
Service Lifetime (from Reference 1)
Because the QSDC procedure is strength-oriented, the
fatigue test procedure can be modified by conducting a- static
test to the same design load required in Section 2.2.6. As
shown on Figure 13, this alternate test requirement may shorten
the fatigue testing time at the expense of conducting an addi-
tional static test.
It should be noted that the curves of Figures 12 and
13 are based on the "standard" vehicle with a structural relia-
bility goal of 0.9999 as identified on Table III. If another
reliability goal is chosen, the curves on Figures 12 and 13 must
be recalculated by the method of Reference 1 (Volume III,
Section III).
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Figure 13. Structural Reliability of the Design for a Fatigue Test
to the End of the Service Life Followed by a Static
Test (from Reference 1).
It is believed that the requirements defined by
Figures 12 and 13 are reasonable and justifiable. However, it
should be kept in mind that there are two major assumptions
involved in formulating the curves of Figures 12 and 13. The
first is that the scatter in life (defined as the ratio of the
2a or maximum life to the mean life) is assumed to be 4 to 1.
This appears to be realistic and slightly conservative on the
basis of the limited amount of test data available at present.
In the same manner that the LTFS and OTFS factors for static
strength (Figures 6 and 7) vary with strength scatter, the
life multiple defined for the fatigue design and test require-
ments will vary. Figures 12 and 13 may be modified for shuttle
design if substantiating data on the life scatter is available.
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The other major assumption is that the shape of the
Residual Strength curve is defined by
Ultimate Strength
KT = loge Residual strength
This definition of the basic shape of the Residual Strength
function appears to be reasonable for correlating the transition
from initial strength to the strength at failure at the end of
the typical fatigue test. It is known that in some situations
the strength degradation is delayed as a result of the time re-
quired for crack nucleation. In such cases the Residual Strength
curve approaches a rectangular shape with a precipitous drop
in strength preceding the final rupture of the material. If
such is the case, the logarithmic decrement in strength assumed
in the formulation of Figures 12 and 13 will be conservative.
It is strongly recommended that any approach to the
time-dependent strength problem that is less conservative than
that recommended in this section of the QSDC Procedure be
examined carefully and judiciously. In any event, the approach
should consider (1) the possibility of failure during the ser-
vice life at loads beyond Limit but less than the design load,
(2) the possibility that the analytical determination of life
is incorrect, and (3) the possibility of-qualifying a design
with inadequate life as the result of the random success of
the test article to an unusually long fatigue life.
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3. STRENGTH SCATTER COEFFICIENT
3 . 1 Definition
The strength scatter of a structural system, defined as the
coefficient of strength variation (YS) > is an important param-
eter in the QSDC Procedure, y represents the dispersion about
the mean of the strength at failure of a group of nominally
identical structures. Mathematically, ys is the standard devia-
tion (a) expressed in nondimensional terms. The coefficient of
variation is equal to the standard deviation divided by the mean
strength (y) of the group of nominally identical structures, i.e.
3 . 2 Importance of the Strength Scatter to the Design Process
Consideration of the scatter in strength of nominally iden-
tical structures is important because of the effect variations
in the scatter have on the calculated reliability of the fleet
of structures. If the reliability is computed from the proba-
bility of failure, the effect of the variation of the scatter
can be shown by the increased probability of failure for the
following three examples which are consistent except for the
respective strength scatter coefficients of 0.00, 0.05, and 0.15.
The choices of Limit and Omega Conditions at 100 and 150 percent
are intended to be comparable to the design values of the Present
System.
The three examples will illustrate that the reliability
of a design (represented by a group of nominally identical struc-
tures) will decrease as the scatter in the strength of the
structures increases. If the scatter is not considered as in
the Present System, the actual reliability of the structure
is not known. All three examples consider a structure designed
by the Present System, that is, with a 1.5 factor of safety.
The basis of the design is a non-dimensional design load of
100 percent. (This is referred to as the Limit Load in both
the Present System and the QSDC Procedure). For the Present
System, the Ultimate Load would equal 150 percent. The figure
derived for the reliability of the structure is not based on
the results of the computer program, but is the result of the
following approximate analysis.
The reliability of the design computed by the program
can be reasonably approximated by using a single strength dis-
tribution instead of the summation of strength distributions
used in the program. When the strength distribution lies midway
between the design load and the ultimate load, the reliability
calculated closely approximates the reliability calculated
by the program. The reliability is calculated by multiplying
the probability of having passed the static test to the ultimate
load by the probability of having a structure with a strength
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equal to the Limit Load. Finally, this combined probability
is multiplied by the probability of exceeding the Limit Load,
thus producing the probability of failure. The reliability
is then the complement of the probability of failure. Performing
this quick analysis on the three examples yields the following:
Example 1 ys = 0.00
In this example, as in the other two, 'the load distri-
bution is assumed to be rectangular. The probability of equal-
ing any level of load up to and including the Limit Load is
one. For all values of load above the Limit, the probability
of exceedance is zero. The Limit Load, as previously stated,
is at 100 percent, and the ultimate load is at 150 percent.
Despite the designer's attempt to place the strength distribution
above the 150 percent level by matching the material allowable
with the ultimate load (Present System design philosophy), the
actual strength distribution of the design is located at 125
percent. Since there is no scatter in the strength of the design
(YS = 0), the strength of each structure is at 125 percent.
The probability of passing the test to 150 percent is zero. The
probability of having a strength at the Limit level is also zero.
The probability of exceeding the Limit Load is zero. The product
of these three probabilities (the probability of failure) is
zero. Therefore, the structure is 100 percent reliable. Tne
test structure will fail the static test to 150 percent and,
therefore, must be redesigned to pass a second static test.
The final result will be that all of the strengths will be
above 150 percent and all of the loads will be below 100 percent.
The structure will still retain its absolute reliability with
the added cost of the increased strength.
Example 2 ys = 0.05
The load distribution is the same as in Example 1. The
location of the mean strength is again at 125 percent. The
strength distribution defined by the ys of 0.05 is concentrated
about the 125 percent level, with only the tails of the distri-
bution crossing the 100 percent and 150 percent levels. The
ultimate load is 25 percent above the mean, and the design
load is 25 percent below the mean. Given that the mean strength
is at 125 percent, the size of the standard deviation (a) can
be computed from the definition of the strength scatter (ys):
Ys = a/V
0 = y y
= OT05 (125)
= 6.25
The number of standard deviations, used as an indication
of the probability of occurrence, is found by dividing the
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difference (A) between the mean and the intended value (here
150 percent) by the size of the standard deviation:
n = A
a
= ill
6.25
= 4.
This value for the standard deviation corresponds to a
probability of occurrence of 3.17 x 10-5. Thus, a successful
strength test to 150 percent would occur once in 31,700 tests.
Similarly, the occurrence of a strength equal to the Limit
level is one in 31,700. The probability of this combination is
about 10 x 10-10. The probability of failure of this design
would therefore be 1 x 10~9 (the probability of exceedance of
the Limit load is one.) The corresponding reliability of the
design would be the complement of this probability of failure
or 0.999999999. The significance of this result is that the
chance of an operational failure at a Limit Condition after a
test article passes a test to 150 percent of Limit is about one
in one billion. This possibility is so near zero that any
structural system can be considered "safe" in operation up
to Limit after the design is qualified by a successful test
to 150 percent of Limit.
Thus, a "safe" structural system results from compliance
with the deterministic requirements of the Present System ap-
parently without any .probabilistic considerations. However,
this desired result is dependent on the strength scatter being
relatively low. In the next example it is shown that the same
procedure will not result in safe structure when the scatter
is large.
Example 3 YS = ^. 15
As in Examples 1 and 2, the mean strength is at 125 percent and
the load distribution is the same. The standard deviation (a)
in this example is:
a =
= .15 (125)
= 18.75
The number of standard deviations (n) is:
n = A
a
25 _
18.75
= 1.33
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The probability of passing the static test to the ultimate
load is 0.0918. Similarly, the probability of having a strength
at the Limit Level is 0.0918. Since the probability of exceed-
ing the Limit Load is one, the probability of failure is 0.00843.
The corresponding reliability is therefore 0.9916. The reduc-
tion in reliability with this variation in strength is very
large: from 0.999999999 to about 0.99. .
It is very dubious that the vehicle user would consider
the vehicle to be "safe" if the chance of catastrophic failure
at Limit were one in one hundred. This change from safe to un-
safe structure has not been a serious problem in the past because
structural systems with large strength scatters were avoided by
empirical means. Such things as brittle materials, long slender
columns, very hot structure, and welds in tension were banned.
In recent years every one of the ground rules resulting in narrow-
scatter structural systems has been abandoned in the quest for
higher performance in structural systems. As a result, large-
scatter structural systems are no longer uncommon.
The QSDC Procedure considers this effect of the strength
scatter. It places the choice of design factors on the basis
of a desired structural reliability goal and the scatter in
strength of the design. In this manner, a consistent level
of reliability is maintained.
3.3 Estimation of the Strength Scatter
Having defined the strength scatter and its role in the
QSDC design Procedure, the estimation of values of strength
scatter to be used in the design of a structure is now dis-
cussed. The strength scatter must be estimated so that design
factors can be assigned to the structure and structural com-
ponents. As discussed in Section 2.2.4, the strength scatter
of the component with the highest strength scatter is used
to define the design factors. The methods of this section are
expected to produce values of strength scatter that will esti-
mate the actual strength scatter of the component considered
with a satisfactory degree of accuracy.
It should be noted at the outset that there is, generally,
insufficient data on which to base a purely statistical estima-
tion of the strength scatter of any given component. The major
amount of data with statistically significant sample sizes
can be found only among material property tests. Most of the
data dealing with component strength scatters have barely enough
samples to permit considering the resulting scatter values sta-
tistically. This deficiency points to a need for more test data,
but more importantly it negates any present need for a highly
analytic estimation method. As more data becomes available,
more refined estimating techniques will be generated. For
the present, however, the following methods for estimating the
strength scatter of a components are presented: a range estima-
tion, a baseline estimation, an estimation by class, an estimation
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by judgement, and a preliminary analytic technique.
Whichever form is chosen to make an estimation of the
strength scatter of the component and, hence, of the structure,
the resulting quantity can be used with confidence. The esti-
mation of the strength scatter, when made with reasonable
engineering judgement, will either be close to the actual value
of the scatter or be conservative enough when used in the QSDC
Procedure to maintain the desired level of reliability. The
reliability of the structure is not greatly sensitive to mod-
erate variations in the estimation of the component strength
scatter. That is, if 0.0425 is specified instead of the actual
0.0400, the reliability might only increase from say 0.9999 to
0.99994. Even with an estimate as low as 0.04 for an actual
scatter (Ys) of 0.05, the reliability figure is reduced from
0.9999 to about 0.9994. Thus, estimates of the strength scatter
of the components and, hence, the strength scatter of the struc-
tural system can be made with enough confidence to permit using
the estimates as the basis for setting preliminary design factors
3.3.1 Range Estimation
This method of estimating the strength scatter of a
component is based on the range in available test data. Essen-
tially the observed range is equated with the expected range
for the given sample size. The expected range for a given
sample size is listed in the following table. The range is
defined by the number (n) of standard deviations (a).
Sample Size n_
5-10 3
10-100 4
100-1000 5
1000-10000 6
10000-100000 8
The observed range is merely the difference between
the highest strength and the lowest strength in the test data
(HI-LO).
The strength scatter, defined as the size of the stan-
dard deviation (a), would then be the range divided by the number
of standard deviations it defines, i.e.,
CHI-LO)
n
The other parameter needed to define the strength
scatter is the mean strength (y) which is approximated by the
arithmetic average of the highest and lowest observed strengths,
1>e
" '_ CHI+LO)
2
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Finally the strength scatter (ys) is estimated by
dividing the standard deviation (a) by the mean (y) , i.e.,
YS = - = n
= 2_ (HI-LO)
n (HI+LO)
where n is determined from the table by the sample size (the
number of test articles).
3.3.2 Baseline Estimation
As a second method for estimating the strength scatter
of structural components, deviations from a standard baseline
strength scatter are considered. The baseline strength scatter
is based on the ±10 percent variation about the mean value expected
in normal engineering work. This nominal variation is equiva-
lent to a YS °f 0.05. Deviations (A) are considered from this
baseline by the simple rule of:
Ys = 0.05 ± A
where the deviations (A) are based on the following considera-
tions concerning the strength scatter of the component. The
material used should be the first consideration: ductile materials
may allow negative deviations (YS less than 0.05), whereas brittle
materials would require positive deviations (YS above 0.05).
Notch sensitivity could be an important parameter here. As a
second consideration, material processes may need investigation.
Standard, well-controlled techniques such as rolling and extru-
sions would produce negative deviations (low Ys)» an<* less pre-
cise methods, such as castings, will produce positive deviations
(high YS) • A third consideration, structural elements, such
as honeycomb and waffle, will result in positive deviations
(high YS) > whereas fasteners and rivets display a negative devia-
tion (low Ys) • Finally, fabrication techniques may need consid-
eration. Standard joint and close tolerances exhibit negative
deviations (low YS) t whereas welds, bonding, and large tolerances
do not (YS high) .
3.3.3 Estimation by Class
A third method of estimating the strength scatter was
suggested by the author in a study contract for NASA (Reference 7) .
This method consists of dividing structures into four classes as in
Table IV. A range of YS is proposed for each class, and a typical
structural form is indicated. If the designer chooses the maximum
strength scatter in any given class for a particular design, the
design will be conservative. If the designer wishes to decrease
the YS below the maximum for the particular design group, justi-
fication of the choice of YS should be made.
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TABLE IV. STRENGTH SCATTER VALUES BASED ON STRUCTURAL CLASSES
Class Description
A These structures are of high-quality, conven-
tional construction for which, from years of
experience, small variation in strength can
be expected. This class will include conven-
tional structure with high ductility materials,
riveted or bolted construction at moderate
temperatures •, etc. The upper limit of YS f°r
this class is arbitrarily set at 0.04.
B These structures include those for which a
slightly higher ys maY be expected than for
Class A structures. In this class will
fall high-quality welded and bonded structures
and those that fail in a simple buckling
mode. The upper limit of ys for this class
is arbitrarily set at 0.09.,
C These structures have a larger variation in
strength than those in Classes A and B, but
are of a quality which may be used occasionally
in primary structure. Most high-quality cast-
ing and structures that fail in buckling prob-
ably fall in this category. The upper limit
of YS f°r this class is arbitrarily set at 0.125.
D All structures having YS > 0-125 are considered
to fall in Class D. Most brittle structures
and shells that buckle catastrophically under
external pressure probably would be classified
as Class D.
A factor that may justify the choice of a lower YS may
be the use of enough static tests for a statistical value of
strength scatter.
3.3.4 Judgement Estimation
Another form of estimating the strength scatter could be
derived from the preliminary estimates of Figure 14. Shown here
are values of YS that are expected to be reasonable for preliminary
design work and are based on engineering judgement. The esti-
mates are made at three different levels: materials, structural
elements, and built-up structure. The strength scatters of the
built-up structure can be used as they are or they can be adjusted
to reflect the knowledge of the designer on the particular
configuration being considered. Although the strength scat-
ter for structural elements may stand by itself, it should
be combined with other appropriate factors by the methods
discussed in Section 3.3.5. The material YS should not repre-
sent the structure; rather it must be combined with other ap-
propriate factors to produce a component YS-
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Figure 14. Typical Values of the Strength Scatter
3.3.5 Preliminary Analytical Technique
The strength scatter of structural components may also
be derived by analytically combining several factors. That is,
the component strength scatter can be synthesized from the con-
sideration of the individual factors that contribute to it. Such
factors might be the variation in material properties (YS^ ),
the variation in dimensions (YSn)> and the variation in the con-
figuration and fabrication of the component (Ys)•
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The combinatory rule for the component strength scatter
is the square root of the sum of the squares; i.e.,
for normally distributed variables.
The combination of two strength scatter factors, the
basic material strength scatter (YSM) and tne configuration and
fabrication strength scatter (Ysp)> is shown graphically in
Figure 15. Several points can be quickly illustrated. First,
the gray region represents the ordinary values expected for the
component strength scatter. The region centers on a YS °f 0.05,
Second, the dominance of one strength scatter factor greatly
in excess of the other strength scatter factors is readily ap-
parent. At point B, the configuration and fabrication strength
scatter is greatly in excess of the basic material strength
scatter, being equal to 0.20 and 0.04, respectively. By the
general rule, component strength scatter (Ys(0 is:
YsC = /YsM2
= /(0.04K + (0.20)2
= 0.204
Thus, the component strength scatter is just about equal to the
configuration and fabrication strength scatter. In such obvious
cases , the configuration and fabrication strength scatter can be
used as the component strength scatter without need for the anal-
ytic estimation. Point C also illustrates the dominance of the
single strength scatter factor. In this case, the material
strength scatter is dominant. The values of material strength
scatter and the configuration and fabrication strength scatter
are 0.20 and 0.02, respectively. The component strength scatter
is :
= /(0.02)2 + (0.20)2
. = 0.201
Thus, the component strength scatter is again essentially equal
to the dominating strength scatter factor.
At the present, the values of strength scatter for
the factors of materials, dimensions, and configurations have
not been developed. This is due to the lack of sufficient
data on which to base a statistical analysis which could gen-
erate the strength scatter values needed for this type of anal-
ysis. In the meantime, however, engineering judgement can be
relied on to arrive at strength scatter values to be used in
the estimation.
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Figure 15. The Combination'of Strength Scatter Factors
3.4 Test Data
The following tables represent the results of the litera-
ture search for strength scatter data. Unfortunately, there was
very little data on the strength scatter of structures avail-
able; and structural components, generally, had insufficient data
points to determine the strength scatter. The material strength
scatter, however, was fairly well represented by the material
property coupon tests. The major source of statistical data was
Reference 8. Most of the difficulty in gathering the strength
scatter data was due to the lack of sufficient information on
the conditions of the test, the test specimens, and the sample
size. In many instances one or the other factor was not clearly
defined so that assumptions had to be made before the data
was correlated.
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The data reported has been arranged in three tables which
parallel the main classifications of Figure 14: materials,
structural elements, and structural assemblies. The strength
scatter (ys) and the sample size (n) have been recorded, and
the material, alloy, heat treatment, and form, when available,
are described. When the information was not available, it was
marked "unspecified."
3.4.1 Materials
The test data of this section are the result of coupon
type tests. That is, the data reported are generally the pro-
ducer's verification of the material. These data are the type
used by the MIL-HDBK-5A committee to determine the material
strength allowables. In some applications these data have been
used for this purpose. The data are reported for room tempera-
tures and tensile loading unless otherwise noted. Strength
scatters reported are for'ultimate loads.
TABLE V. STRENGTH SCATTER DATA ON STRUCTURAL MATERIALS
Material Alloy H.T. (YS) Form Ref.
ALUMINUM 2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
7079
356
356
7075
T6
T6
T6
T6
T651
2024
2024
2024
2024
2024
2024
2024
2024
7049
7049
7075
7075
7075
7075
T3
T4
T36
T3
14
T36
T6
T73
. T73
T6
•T6
T6
T6
T6
T6
T6
201 T6
201 •. T7
201 T43
T6
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
STEEL - 1035
Low Carbon 1018
1045
1117
1137
.05
.04 .
.0507
.0415
.034
.0610
.0795
.055
.063
.073
sheet, bare
sheet, bare
sheet, clad
sheet, clad
.0264 plate
extrusion
20
0403
0403
0403
0500
0400
0507
0410
04
0653
0403
0500
0496
0506
0407
0267
0514
0695
0279
0262
0312
sheet, bare
sheet, bare
sheet, bare
sheet, clad
sheet, clad
sheet, clad
sheet, clad
sheet, clad
forging, hand
forging, die
sheet, bare
sheet, bare
sheet, clad
forgings
forgings
casting
casting'
casting
casting
--
--
--
--
--
165
72
--
--
204
183
--
40
40
40
8
8
8
8
8
8
• 9
9
10
10
8
8
8
10
11
8
10
10
10
01-. 05
01-. 05
03
05-. 17
0653
bar, extrusion
sheet
tube
casting
forging
5500
950
60
680
--
12
12
12
12
10
bar
bar
bar
bar
bar
913
58
40
105
140
50
TABLE V. - Continued
Material
Low Carbon
Alloy H.T.
12L14
12L14
12L14
12L14
12L14
12L14
12L14 .
12L14
High Carbon 1
Stainless
Stainless
Super Alloy
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
%C-%Mn
.17-. 75
.17-. 75
.20-1.25
.22-. 65
.24-. 60
.26-. 70
.28-. 70
.30-1.50
.37-. 75
.44-. 70
201
301
301
301
304
304
304
347
301
301
301
301
301
301
403
403
410
446
17-7PH
17-7PH
17-7PH
17-4PH
AM-350
AM-350
355
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
(YS)
.073
.046
.034
.037
.027
.039
.038
.072
.086
.084
.053
.083
.104
.066
.094
.062
.053
.042
.041
.049
.0405
.049
.0595
.0487
.0625
.057
.080
.038
.026
.067
.069
.034
.060
.068
.045
.057-. 061
.0599
.0545
.0418
.036-. 048
.014
.100
.033
.068
.030
.050
.070
.070
.024
.049
.071
.042
.01-. 02
.05
.10
Form n
bar 64
sheet 100
sheet, draw qual 160
sheet, draw qual 170
sheet, draw qual 190
sheet, killed 120
sheet, rimmed 180
sheet, rimmed 150
sheet 301
sheet 437
sheet 109
sheet 113
sheet 312
sheet 212
sheet 276
sheet 392
sheet 306
casting 180
casting, tempered 45
casting 45
casting, annealed 25
casting, annealed 20
casting 513
casting, tempered 100
513
tempered 50
513
sheet § strip 102
17
100
182
bars 45
tubing 204
tubing 98
tubing- 149
annealed
1/4 hard, sheet 489
1/2 hard, sheet 195
3/4 hard, sheet 224
1 hard, sheet 270
.027 sheet 6
bars, rolled 549
204
tubing 88
tubing 66
sheet 106
101
541
bar 101
sheet 194
sheet 93
bar 44
bar 50
casting 190
Honeycomb
PH15-7MO core
Ref.
8
8
8
• 8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
B
»
4
10
10
10
10
13
8
8
8
9
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
12
12
4
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TABLE V. - Concluded
Material
IRON
Malleable
Pearlitic
Alloy H.T.
35018
32510
32510
BHNa
217-235
217-235
CYS)
.0425
.052
.040
.053
.053
Form
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
n
159
434
785
127
172
Ref .
8
8
8
8
8
Brinell Hardness Number
Pearlitic
MAGNESIUM
SUPERALLOY
TITANIUM
BERYLLIUM
BERYLLIUM
197-212
197-212
179-192
163-174
Unspecified
Unspecified
Nickel
Nickel
6A1--4V
6A1-4V
6A1-4V
6A1-4V
5Al-2.5Sn
8Al-2Cb-lTa
8Mn
5Al-2.8Cr-l.
4A1-3MO-1V
4A1-3MO-1V
16V02.5A1
Pure
Unspecified
CA170
CA170
CA170
CA170
CA170
CA170
CA170
CA170
CA172
CA172
CA172
CA172
CA172
CA172
CA172
CA172
CA175
CA175
CA175
CA175
CA172
CA172
CA172
.062
.043
.064
.074
.02-. 04
.07-. 19
.04
.045
.046
.049
.044
.051
.055
.1815
.050
2Fe.080
.043
.035
.0425 .
.0501
.0470
.093
.037
.0445
.039
.042
.0421
.030
.0374
.0284
.0384
.0385
.048 '
.033
.0392
.0296
.0378
.0238
.0527
.0585
.0544
.0362
.05
.0716
.071
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
bar
casting
sheet
casting
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
sheet
Unspeci f ied
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
sheet
sheet
extrus ion , tubing
strip
strip
strip
strip
strip
strip
strip
strip
strip
strip
strip
strip
strip
strip
strip
strip
strip
strip
strip
strip
bar 6 rod
bar § rod
bar § rod
229
161
261
143
130
240
1493
250
2542
603
318
115
1640
15
113
377
1426
1414
755
170
127
66
66
80
80
95
94
63
63
132 '
132
132
131
132
129
132
131
92
92
95
95
125
169
169
8
8 •
8
8
12
12
15
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10 .
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3.4.2 Structural Elements
The structural element represents the sub-component
level of a structure. Examples of items that would fall in this
category are special forgings or castings, fittings, and fabri-
cation details. Specific examples of structural elements might
be rotor hub castings made for helicopters, and examples of the
fabrication details of joints would be lap or butt joints or the
fabrication details of honeycomb or waffle panels. Generally, the
structural element data should be representative of the user
form of the material to be differentiated from the producer
form of the material, such as sheet, plate, extrusion, bar, and
rod. The user form of the material would be the formation of spars,
ribs, longerons, fittings, honeycombs, etc.
TABLE VI. STRENGTH SCATTER DATA ON STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS
Type
JOINTS
FASTENERS
Material
Rivets Aluminum
Steel
Aluminum
Steel
Sheet Aluminum
Steel
Steel
Steel
YS
.06
.06
.07
.06
.09
.09
.12
.12
.02-. 07
.02-. 07
.006-. 013
Failure Mode
shear
shear
shear
shear
bearing tear
bearing tear
bearing tear
bearing tear
bolt nut
bolt shank
shear
n
1400
900
650
85
1400
900
650
85
130
40
25
Ref .
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
.12
12
12
10
WELDS
Titanium
TI-6A1-4V
TI-6A1-4V
TI-6A1-4V
TI-6A1-4V
Steel
Aluminum
Magnesium
Steel
Steel
Steel
.013-.026 shear
.00276
.0048
.01029
.01206
.0376
.08
.19
.10
.07
.14
dbl shear
dbl shear
dbl shear
dbl shear
10
15
15
15
15
flush head
sheet, weld
sheet, weld
sheet, weld
sheet, weld
tube, weld
95
240
400
270
120
40
10
10
10
10
10
10
12
12
12
12
12
53
3.4.3 Structural Assemblies
This grouping of test data pertains to the full-scale
structural components or structural.subassemblies. In general,
statistical data on complete full-scale structures is rare.
Usually, not more than one full-scale structure is statically
tested to failure, and there is little evidence that any particular
design was tested at the full-scale level enough times for a good
statistical data point. On the other hand, structural subassemb-
lies or component-level tests have been conducted enough times for
an estimation of the strength scatter. . • .
TABLE VII. STRENGTH SCATTER DATA ON STRUCTURAL ASSEMBLIES
Material
WO'ODEN
METAL
GLASS
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Ys
.073
.02 -.03
.11-.29
.07-. 17
.10-.16
.24
.017
.046 • •
.033
.060
.045
.081
.099
.10
.21
.017-. 043
' Description
"Master" Tailplane
"Typhoon" Tailplane
"Vampire" canopy pressure
"Vanguard", pressure
"TSR2" tough glass,
pressure
Perspex, pressure
"Hudson" tailplane
"Whitley" tailplane,
up bending
"Whitley" tailplane,
down bending
"Whitley" tailplane,
torsion
"Mustang" wings, bending
"F-80" tailplane, bending
"F-86D" tailplane, bending
Large thin shells, R/t =
4000
Cylinders unpressurized
Cylinders pressurized
n
60
35
90
150
30
6
13
7
21
5
3
3
5
15
15
Ref.
12
12
• 12
12
12
12
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
17
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3.4.4 Compressive Strength Data
The following data on compressively loaded cylinders
and shells, with and without pressurization and with and with-
out stiffeners, was gathered from the references listed. Be-
cause of the variety of failure modes (FM) associated with com-
pressive loading, the failure modes have been included in the
table, where possible. Although most of these data points
represent experimental data on small thin shells and cylinders,
the results still illustrate the large scatters in compressive
loading. Full-size structures can be expected to exhibit as
large a strength scatter as these data indicate. Since geometry
of the structure plays a large role in determining the strength
scatter for .compressive loads, the dimensions of the test specimen
were noted with as much detail as possible. The strength scatter
is sensitive to the sample size, and, therefore, this should be
considered in using the table.
TABLE VIII. STRENGTH SCATTER DATA FOR ELEMENTS IN
COMPRESSIVE LOADING
Material
7075-T6
7075-T6
2S
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
. 18
18
-H
-8
-8
-8
-8
-8
-8
-8
-8
-8
-8
-18
Steel
Steel
Steel
Steel
Steel
Steel
Steel
Steel
Steel
Steel
FM
BK' .
BK
BK
BK
BK
BK
BK
BK
BK
BK
BK
BK •
BK
YS
.092
.071
.186
.078
.146
.138
.065
.125
.065
.055
.090
.096
.133
Description Dimensions
L(in)
Stiffened Cylinder, 30
Pressurized
Stiffened Cylinder, 15
Pressurized
Unstiffened
Pressurized
Unstiffened
Pressurized
Unstiffened
Pressurized
Unstiffened
Pressurized
Unstiffened
Pressurized
Unstiffened
Pressurized
Unstiffened
Pressurized
Unstiffened
Pressurized
Unstiffened
Pressurized
Unstiffened
Pressurized
Unstiffened
Cylinder,
Cylinder,
Cylinder,
Cylinder,
Cylinder,
Cylinder,
Cylinder,
Cylinder
Cylinder,
Cylinder,
Cylinder,
21.
21.
21.
21.
21.
9.
9.
21.
21.
21.
21,
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
R/t
680
680
1750
1006
1006
1006
2734
2734
2734
2734
2734
2734
2734
n
3
3
3
4
4
3
6
3
3
7
7
4
7
Ref.
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Pressurized
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TABLE V I I I . - Concluded
Material
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
S-glass
Epoxy
FRP
FRP
FRP
FRP
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Symbol
BK
BN
CF
NA
FM
BN
BN
BN
BN
BK
CF
NA
NA
BK
BK
LYC
GI
LI
GI
LI
GI
GI
YS
.478
.445
..635
.485
.05
.119
.098
.087
.154
.122
.0923
.509
.250
.368
.182
.333
.484
Description
Unstiffened Cylinder
Unpressurized
Unstiffened Cylinder
Unpressurized
Unstiffened Cylinder
Unpressurized
Unstiffened Cylinder
Unpressurized
Spherical Shell,
Honeycomb
Cylinder, helical
wound
Cylinder, honeycomb
Cylinder, honeycomb
Curved Panel,
Cylindrical
Flat Panel, Sandwich
Stiffened Cylinder
Cylinder, Waffle
0°-90°
Cylinder, Waffle
0°-90°
Cylinder, Waffle 45°
Cylinder Waffle, 45°
Stiffened Cylinder,
Stringers
Stiffened Cylinders,
T-stiffeners
Definition Symbol
Buckling
Bending
Compressive
Information
LYC
GI
Fracture LI
Not Available Z
Dimensions n Ref.
Z
330 4
1350 6
, 3000 3
4000 3
L(in) R/t
1450 3
2.0 425 3
72 117 7
72 117 4
NA 3
NA 15
t
.020 4
NA 9
NA 7
NA 6
NA 6
NA 6
t R
.1851 459 6
Definition
Local Yielding
21'
21
21
21 '
22
23
24
24
24
22
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
General Instability
Local Instability
L2/Rt (1-u2)1/2
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4. EXAMPLES
In order to illustrate the application of the QSDC Method-
ology as described in Section 2 and the use of the strength
scatter data compiled in Section 3, the following examples were
devised. Each example is intended to demonstrate the concepts
which are unique to the QSDC Methodology and perhaps puzzling
to the designer accustomed to the Present System. Examples
4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the definition of design conditions,
both Limit and Omega, for controllable and-noncontrollable oper-
ational conditions, respectively. Example 4.3 demonstrates
the use of strength scatter data in a material trade-off anal-
ysis with the QSDC Procedure. A problem of designing for an
elevated temperature environment is treated in Example 4.4.
Example 4.5 is concerned with design for combined conditions,
utilizing the QSDC Methodology.
4.1 Illustration of Design Condition Definition by Operational
Restriction
During the launch phase of the Space Shuttle mission, the
decrease in vehicle weight due to fuel consumption would result
in a continuously increasing longitudinal acceleration for a
constant engine thrust. The load factor resulting from this
operation would be a severe operational condition imposed on
the structure. A reasonable solution to this problem is to
control the thrust level to restrict the load factor to an ac-
ceptable range. Thus, an example of an operational condition
that would require a restriction would be the longitudinal load
factor (LLF). The restriction is necessary to optimize the
structural weight. As a particular case, it is assumed that
a hypothetical analysis yields a 3.0 restriction on the LLF.
An illustration of the nominal longitudinal load factor versus
time is shown in Figure 16. The restriction to 3.0 is shown
as the solid line labeled "CONTROLLED." The dashed line labeled
"UNCONTROLLED" represents the nonrestricted longitudinal load
factor.
The Limit and Omega Conditions can be defined by the
variation in longitudinal load factor produced by the control
system. A typical control system can be expected to control
the thrust so that the resulting LLF will not exceed 105 percent
of the nominal 3.0 value. Only in very rare cases, such as
a gross malfunction, would the thrust control system allow
the LLF to exceed 120 percent of the nominal value. Assuming
that the nominal value of the condition is exceeded half of
the time, the three points can be used to produce a cumulative
probability of exceedance curve of longitudinal load factor
as in Figure 17. The terms "usually" and "almost always" can
be interpreted as probabilities of 0.01 and 0.0001, respectively.
These values are consistent with the levels of cumulative proba-
bility used to define the Limit and Omega Conditions for the
standard S,R.pQAL of 0.9999 (see Table III) and will be used
in this hypothetical example.
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Note that the Limit and Omega Conditions could be established
deterministically. If the 105 percent of Limit Condition (3.15G)
satisfies criteria similar to those ordinarily used in establish-
ing Limit Conditions such as in NASA SP-8057 (Reference 2), it can
be considered to meet the QSOC requirements:
(1) Qualitatively, the Limit Condition should be the
upper boundary of normal and expected operational
conditions.
(2) The Limit Condition should impose little, if any,
limitation on operational, usage during the planned
mission.
(3) There should be general agreement among all con-
cerned (structural and propulsion systems, mission
planning, program manager, etc.) that any exceed-
ance of the Limit Condition will result in an in-
vestigation to determine the cause and corrective
action to prevent future exceedances.
All concerned should agree that the Omega Condition, 120 percent of
the Limit value (3.6G), meet the following criteria:
(1) The Omega Condition can occur only as the result of
a gross malfunction of the propulsion control system.
(2) If a catastrophic structural failure occurs at or be-
yond the Omega Condition, the failure will not be
considered the responsibility of the structural
system.
(3) The correction action for such a gross malfunction
will be to modify and improve the performance and
reliability of the propulsion control system.
These criteria for defining the Limit and Omega Conditions
require decisions by the responsible management which can be
reduced to yes or no answers. As noted, the Limit Condition
is essentially the same as the traditional Limit Condition.
There is no intent to change the procedures already established
for defining Limit Conditions. However, more consistent Limit
Conditions would result if the criteria were quantitized as
shown in Table III.
Omega or overload conditions have generally not been defined
in the past with the exception of some ultimate conditions,
notably landing impact and crash loads. However, there has
always been an implicit definition for such conditions. In
the event of a catastrophic failure, an accident investigation
group is usually convened to establish the "probable cause."
In many cases, the probable cause resides in a nonstructural
system and no corrective action is required. If no structural
system has been judged responsible after the fact, it seems
reasonable that the same decision can be made in advance.
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The next step of the design procedure would be to determine
the design and test factor of safety (TFS) for the Limit and
Omega Conditions. From Figures 6 and 7 the LTFS and OTFS for
the condition can be found according to the scatter in structural
strength. The booster-orbiter attachment fitting is selected
as a typical structural component to illustrate this application
of the QSDC Procedure. It is assumed that the attachment fitting
will be a 7075-T6 aluminum forging. To simplify the problem,
no elevated temperature effects are considered.
The strength scatter for a 7075-T6 forging is 0.0407 from
the data in Section 3.4. Entering the curve of Figure 6 with
this value for the strength scatter, a desired design structural
reliability of 0.9999, and a qualification requirement of one
static test yields an LTFS of 1.24. A similar use of the curve
in Figure 7 gives an OTFS of 1.0.
If these factors were applied to the loads produced by the
Limit and Omega Conditions (here the 3.15G and 3.60G refer
to loads and not conditions), the design load of 3.90G for
the Limit Condition and the design load of 3.60G for the Omega
Condition would result. The more severe of the two loads, namely
the 3.90G load, is chosen as the design load for the attachment
fitting. This choice insures a sufficient reserve against
understrength and some capability above the requirement to sur-
vive overloads.
The Present System (1.5FS) would determine the Limit Condi-
tion from the nominal value of the restricted operational con-
dition and the variation of conditions about this nominal. The
load that corresponds to the Limit Condition 3.15G is multiplied
by l.S. The resulting Ultimate Load of 4.72G is used as the de-
sign point. In comparison with the QSDC Procedure, the Present
System would tend to overdesign the structure by 21 percent.
4.2 Illustration of Design Condition Definition for Noncontrol-
lable Operational Conditions
Of the conditions chosen as operational conditions, those
that describe the natural environment are noncontrollable. For
example, the encounter of gusts in atmospheric flight is beyond
the control of either the structural system or any non-structural
system. The avoidance of severe thunderstorms may be a form of
control, but this is only a partial control; it excludes consid-
eration of the maximum velocity gusts. The range of average
gust velocities is not avoided-and such velocities form a non-
controlled operational condition. This noncontrollable condition
could be contrasted with the controllable operational condition
of the longitudinal load factor used in Example 4.1. In the
latter, the propulsion system organization can control the thrust
and thereby control the longitudinal load factor; whereas in the
former no non-structural system can control the gust velocity.
The structural system must provide sufficient strength to survive
the Limit Condition without failure and sufficient strength for
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overloads. It can be shown that the Present System does not pro-
vide for overloads sufficiently by simply using the 1.5 factor
of safety. In contrast, the QSDC Procedure does not depend on the
factor of safety to provide for the overload capability in strength
Rather, it utilizes a specific design requirement for overloads,
the Omega Condition.
To illustrate the lack of overload capability provided by
the Present System, consider the design of the structure for the
symmetrical, vertical gust encountered in atmospheric flight.
In particular, consider the criteria set down by Reference 27
and used in Reference 2 for symmetrical vertical gusts. A cri-
terion, the Limit Condition, for gusts is a 50 feet per second de-
rived gust velocity (Ude) for the maximum level flight velocity
(V^ ). The condition, gust velocity, is converted to the vehicle
response, and then interpreted in the design process as the nor-
mal load factor (Nz). As a load factor, the criterion for sym-
metrical gusts becomes a specific design requirement that can be
met. For our example of a 50 feet per second gust at V^, the
incremental load factor due to the gust is 1.5G. The incremental
load factor is linearly dependent on the gust velocity:
ANZ = k Ude
where k = 0.03 (ft/sec)"1 for this example. The load factor exper-
ienced in level flight (l.OG reference) would then be 2.5G for
positive (up) gusts and -0.5G for negative (down) gusts. Assuming
that the internal loads associated with the 2.5G load factor and
-0.5G load factor can be represented by these load factor values,
the ultimate loads would then be represented by the Limit Load
Factors multipled by 1.5. The ultimate load for positive (up)
gusts would be represented by 3.75G, and the ultimate load for
negative (down) gusts would be represented by -0.75G. These loads
would represent increments in load factor of +2.75G and -1.75G
which are not symmetrical about the l.OG level flight reference.
Interpreting these load factors in terms of gust velocities, the
ultimate loads represent gust velocities of 91.7 feet per second
for positive gusts and -58.4 feet per second for negative gusts.
The 1.5 factor of safety does not provide much overload capability
for negative gusts, but it does provide a large overload capa-
bility for positive gusts. Although it has provided sufficient
strength for the ±50 feet per second symmetrical, vertical gust
as a Limit Condition, it has not provided for a symmetrical gust
greater than 58.4 feet per second (with the exception of addi-
tional positive gust capability). The design problem of defin-
ing a sufficient overload would arise from having the different
gust velocities of +91.7 feet per second and -58.4 feet per
second for positive and negative gusts. If, on the one hand,
the ±58.4 feet per second gust is sufficient as an overload con-
dition then the design for positive gusts (+91.7 feet per second)
is too severe and could be reduced. On the other hand, if the
±91.7 feet per second gust is the proper value for an overload
gust condition then the structure is understrength for the
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negative gusts (-58.4 feet per second) and the strength should be
increased.
The QSDC Procedure avoids the confusion that could result
from depending on the factor of safety to provide overload capa-
bility in strength. The QSDC provides for the overload capability
in strength by specifying a separate and distinct design condi-
tion for overload, the Omega Condition. Sufficient strength at
this condition is insured by the Omega Design and Test Factor
of Safety (OTFS) applied. The Present System provides some over-
load capability by applying a factor of safety (typically 1.5)
to the Limit Loads. The increment in operational overload capa-
bility is indeterminate and may vary from one design to the next.
The QSDC Procedure specifies the Limit and Omega Conditions
on the basis of their probability of exceedance (see Section 2.2.2,
Table III). For the example of the symmetrical, vertical gust en-
countered in high-speed level flight, the QSDC would specify the
Limit and Omega Conditions from a probability of exceedance curve,
such as in Figure 18. Assuming that the booster or orbiter struc-
tures are designed for the standard reliability goal of 0.9999,
the probability of exceeding the Limit and Omega Conditions would
be 1 x 10~2 and 1 x'l'O"1*, respectively. From the figure, the Limit
Condition would be a ±50 feet per second gust, as in the Present
System, and the Omega Condition would be ±79 feet per second gust.
The criteria, the Limit and Omega Conditions, are then interpreted
in terms of normal load factor (Nz), as in the Present System.
The incremental load factor due to the Limit Condition is ±1.5G
as before, and the incremental load factor due to the Omega Condition
is ±2.37G. The load factors at high-speed level flight would
be +2.5G and -0.5G for positive and negative Limit gusts and +3.37G
and -1.37G for positive and negative Omega gusts, respectively.
To insure sufficient strength for the Limit and Omega Conditions,
the Design and Test Factors of Safety (TFS) of Figures 6 and 7 are
applied to the loads on the structure. For the standard relia-
bility goal and an assumed strength scatter for the booster or
orbiter structure of 0.05, the Limit Design and Test Factor of
Safety (LTFS) of Figure 6 would be 1.32. The Omega Design and
Test Factor of Safety (OTFS) for the specified reliability and
strength scatter would be.1.0 (see Figure 7). The booster and
orbiter structure would then be designed to the most critical
positive and negative loads associated with the Limit and Omega
Conditions. The Design loads for the Limit Condition are the
product of the Limit Loads (represented by the load factor of
+2.5G and -0.5G) and the LTFS (1.32). Thus the Design Loads for
the Limit Condition are 3.30G and -0.66G for the positive and nega-
tive Limit gust Conditions, respectively. The Design Loads for
the Omega Condition, similarly, are the product of the Omega
Loads (load factors of 3.37G and -1.37G) and the OTFS (1.0).
Since the OTFS equals 1.0, the Design Load for the Omega Condi-
tion equals the Omega Load: 3.37G for positive gusts and -1.37G
for negative gusts. By designing for the +3.37G and -1.37G load
factors, sufficient strength is provided for the overload require-
ment represented by the gust condition of ±79 feet per second.
;
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In comparison, the Present System designs to a +3.75G and
-0.75G load factors and thus provides sufficient strength for the
understrength requirement represented by the ±50 feet per second
gust. The resulting overload capability is for a +91.7 feet per
second gust and a -58.4 feet per second gust, which is not truly
representative of an overload requirement for symmetric gust ve-
locities.
4.3 Illustration of Material Trade-Off Through the QSDC Procedure
This example will show a technique for making material trade-
offs based on the strength requirements of the QSDC Procedure.
The subject will be the engine support truss of the launch vehi-
cle. For simplicity, the thrust distribution of Figure 3 is
assumed. The Limit Condition is assumed as the 1:100 occurrence
value in thrust, and the Omega Condition is assumed as the 1:10,000
occurrence value in thrust. From the figure, the Limit thrust is
1,000,000 pounds-force. The Omega thrust is 1,200,000 pounds-force
(The choice of Limit and Omega values is based on the standard
structural reliability goal (0.9999) with one static test).
The materials to be considered for trade-offs in this example
are tubing of (1) steel, (2) beryllium, and (3) Lockalloy. The
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steel tubing used will be Type 304 in the annealed condition.
From the strength scatter data of Section 3, the strength scatter
coefficient for this steel tubing equals 0.060. The correspond-
ing LTFS (from Figure 6) for the structural reliability indicated
above is 1.41 and the OTFS (from Figure 7) is 1.0.
The Design Load for the Limit Condition is computed for the
steel tubing:
Design Load for Limit Condition = LTFS x Lrmit Load
= 1.41 x 1 x 106 pounds
= 1.41 x 106 pounds-force
and the Design Load for the Omega Condition is computed:
Design Load for Omega Condition = OTFS x Omega Load
= 1.0 x 1.2 x 106
= 1.2 x 106 pounds-force
Of the two Design Loads computed in the above manner, the
greater load is used as the critical load; in this example the
Design Load for the Limit Condition is used. (Note that this
means that more strength is needed to provide a reserve against
understrength than to provide a capability for overloads). The
structure is then designed for the critical load in the same
fashion as in the Present System.
The material trade-offs in this example will be based on
the weight of the material required to obtain a design with the
structural reliability specified. The Type 304 steel tubing will
be used as the base line. From Reference 28, Table 2.8.1.1, the
reported.ultimate tensile strength for Type 304 steel is 75000
pounds per square inch and the density is 0.286 pounds per cubic
inch. The strength to weight ratio is:
Strength to Weight Ratio = Strength t Weight
= 75000 Ib in3
in2 .286 Ib
= 2.62 x 105 ikiiH
Ib
For the second material, beryllium, the strength scatter
coefficient is approximated from the typical histogram "represent-
ing test results of the failing load for beryllium tubing as shown
in Figure 19 as follows:
Y = HI-LO
's 2(HI+LO)
155-85
2(155+85)
= .146
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where HI is the largest observed strength and LO is the smallest
observed strength in the test results. When this strength scatter
and the standard reliability goal are used, the LTFS (from Figure
6) is 2.85 and the OTFS (from Figure 7) is 1.09.
CD
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Figure 19. Typical Histogram of Number of Failing Articles
versus Failing Load for Beryllium
Once again, the Design Loads for Limit and Omega Conditions
are computed. The Limit and Omega Loads remain at 1 x 106 pounds
and 1.2 x 106 pounds, respectively, but the LTFS and OTFS have
increased, making the Design Loads 2.85 x 106 pounds for Limit
and 1.31 x 106 pounds for Omega. Since the Limit Design Load is
critical for this material, the structure is designed to sustain
2.85 x 106 pounds. (Note that the Design Load for the Limit Con-
dition for beryllium structure is different from the Design Load
for the Limit Condition for the steel structure). The strength-
to-weight ratio for beryllium is 5.97 x 10s pounds-force inches
per pound-mass as computed from the data in Table 9.2.1.1 of
Reference 28.
The required weight of steel and beryllium structure can be
computed by dividing the Design Load by the strength-to-weight
ratio; i.e.,
Required Weight = Design Load T Strength/Weight
The required weight of the steel tubing is:
= 1.41 x 106 Ibs v 2.62 x 10
= 5.39 Ib
in
and for the beryllium:
= 2.85 x 106 Ibs r 5.97 x 10s lb"in
IK lb
= 4.78 i£
in
,s Ib-in
Ib
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Taking the beryllium-to-steel ratio, the relative weight of
beryllium to steel for the thrust structure becomes:
4.78 Ib
in'
5.39 Ib = .887 or 1
r 1.125in
Thus, .887 pounds of beryllium could be used with the same
reliability as 1 pound of steel. This ratio is less favorable
to beryllium than obtained if a uniform factor of safety were
used for both materials as in the Present System. However, be-
cause of the higher strength scatter associated with beryllium,
the gain in weight saved in the structure is traded for a con-
sistent level of reliability.
For the Lockalloy tubing, the same comparison can be made.
Starting with a histogram similar to Figure 19, a strength scat-
ter can be derived (no data available). For the sake of this
example, the strength scatter is assumed to equal 0.07. Refer-
ring again to Figures 6 and 7 with this value for the strength
scatter and the standard structural reliability goal, the values
of LTFS and OTFS are 1.51 and 1.0, respectively. The design
load for Limit and Omega Conditions are, therefore, 1.51 x 106
pounds and 1.2 x 106 pounds, equalling the product of the Limit
and Omega Loads and the TFS, respectively.
Assuming the strength to weight ratio to be 3.54 x 10s
pound- force inch per pound-mass, the required weight of Lockalloy
is :
1.5. x 106 Ib Ib
3.54 x 105 Ib-in m
Ib
and the relative weight of Lockalloy to steel is:
4.26 Ib/in = .790
5.39 Ib/in
Thus, .790 pounds of Lockalloy will produce the same reliability
as 1 pound of steel.
The strength-to-weight ratio of Lockalloy is lower than that
of beryllium; but the more consistent failing strength, as re-
flected by the lower strength scatter, permits a lower LTFS and
a lighter weight, more efficient structure. The inconsistency
in strength of the more brittle material, beryllium, as reflected
in the higher strength scatter, requires larger factors of safety
to provide the needed structural reliability.
In conclusion, the minimum weight structure can be made with
66
the Lockalloy material, even though the Design Load is higher than
that for steel. Although this example is greatly simplified, it
illustrates the trade-off technique that can be employed in the
design process.
4.4 Example of Thermal Considerations in Designing with the
QSDC Procedure
In order to demonstrate an application of the QSDC Procedure
(References 1 and 5) to a problem involving elevated temperature
environment for a structure, the following hypothetical problem
is presented. Consider the design of a beam element of the sup-
port structure of the ablative heat shield of an Apollo-type entry
vehicle. The beam must be designed to carry a uniformly distributed
pressure of w pounds per inch as shown in Figure 20.
w
"
b/inl
Figure 20. Typical Beam Loading for Heat Shield Support
During the entry the ablative shield can be expected to con-
duct a certain amount of heat energy into the beam, resulting in
a temperature rise and a strength degradation of the structure.
The following assumptions are made:
1) No thermal stresses exist in the beam.
2) There is no inelastic material behavior during
the entry.
3) The entire effect of temperature is a reduction
of the material strength.
4) The load and temperature experienced by the struc-
ture are specified by the trajectory of the entry.
5) The entry trajectory is fully specified by the
entry velocity, V.
Utilizing these assumptions the QSDC procedure can be applied
in four steps: (L) establish Limit and Omega Conditions (defined)
in Section 2.2.2); (2) establish Limit and Omega Loads (Section
2.2.3); (3) obtain design Limit and Omega Loads (Section 2.2.4);
and (4) design for the most critical design load to obtain a zero
margin of safety at that load (Section 2.2.5).
The QSDC Procedure requires that two separate and distinct
conditions be established for any operation. These conditions
are the Limit Condition, that condition which can be expected to
occur during normal operation of the vehicle, and the Omega
Condition, which is not expected to occur during normal operation
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but is considered to be possible. Generally, exceedance of
the Limit Condition should be an infrequent occurrence, say a
probability of exceedance of 10"2. Exceedance of the Omega
Condition should be very rare, say a probability of exceedance
of 10"1*. These conditions are then said to specify the particu-
lar operation.
In the hypothetical problem, the organization responsible
for controlling the entry velocity would be required to utilize
past statistics, rational analysis, experience, judgement, and
any other means to establish the Limit and Omega entry trajec-
tories by defining the Limit and Omega Conditions for entry
velocity. If there were insufficient past statistical data on
this problem, the responsible organization might conclude that
on the basis of rational analysis and judgement, an entry of
37000 feet per second is the maximum velocity required for normal
operations and mission success and that an entry velocity of
41000 feet per second is the worst-possible velocity that could
result. These then become the Limit and Omega Conditions, re-
spectively, and are binding requirements on the group responsible
for the entry velocity.
A graphical representation of this state of affairs is
given in Figure 21.
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ENTRY VELOCITY, V
Figure 21. Typical Probability of Exceedance of Entry Velocity
Once the Limit and Omega Conditions have been established,
the following are true:
(1) Any condition below Limit must not result in a
structural failure.
(2) Any condition greater than Limit but less than
Omega must be survivable by "most" structures.
The loads that the structure encounters during each dis-
crete condition must now be obtained for the structural designer.
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The QSDC Procedure specifies two levels of external loading
that must be considered during the design. The Limit Load is
defined as the most critical load associated with the conditions
within the Limit Condition envelope, and the Omega Load is
the most critical load associated with the conditions within
the Omega envelope. In many cases the Limit and Omega Loads
are found to correspond directly to the Limit and Omega Condi-
tions, thus eliminating the need to consider other conditions.
For the example problem, assume this correspondence holds:
LIMIT CONDITION: V = 37000 fps
LIMIT LOADS: W = 100 Ibs/in
T = 500°F
OMEGA CONDITION: V = 41000 fps
OMEGA LOADS W = 123 Ibs/in
T = 800°F
Note that there is no factorial relationship between the Limit
and Omega Loads. These loads arise from two separate require-
ments and as such are dependent only on the transfer function
between the Limit and the Omega Condition and the local loads
on the component under consideration.
It now becomes the structural designer's problem to design
the structure so that (1) "no" failure can be expected at the Limit
Condition and (2) most vehicles can be expected to survive to the
Omega Condition. To accomplish these goals, the QSDC Procedure
defines Design Limit and Omega Loads that are loads for the Limit
and Omega Conditions obtained by multiplying the Limit and Omega
Loads by appropriate factors of safety. These factors, known as
the Limit TFS and the Omega TFS, are shown on Figures 6 and 7.
They were derived in Reference 1 to account for the observed scat-
ter in strength, the meaning attached to the term "most" used
above (i.e., the structural reliability goal), and the number
of independent tests that the resulting structure must pass for
design qualification. The design loads are determined as follows:
DESIGN LOAD FOR THE LIMIT CONDITION = LIMIT LOAD X LIMIT TFS
DESIGN LOAD FOR THE OMEGA CONDITION = OMEGA LOAD X OMEGA TFS
For the example problem, suppose that the structure will
have one test, the structural reliability goal is standard, and
the strength-temperature envelope is given in Figure 22. The
statistical scatter in the strength can be approximated from the
envelope using the procedure of Section 3.3.1 as:
(YS )7 0 = 0.051 (Y s )500 = ° - 0 5 8 (Ys )800 = °'063
Utilizing the TFS curves of Figures 6 and 7 and the allowable
ultimate stress given in Figure 22, the following can be shown:
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(Ys.)sOO =
(FTU)SOO
0 .058; therefore, LIMIT TFS = 1.39
= 54 KSI
O-063; therefore, OMEGA TFS = 1.00
•
 35 KSI
Consequently, the design loads are as follows:
DESIGN LOAD FOR LIMIT: W = 100 x 1.39 = 139 Ibs/in
T = 500° F
DESIGN LOAD FOR OMEGA: W = 123 x 1.00 = 123 Ibs/in
T = 800° F
(O
I*I-
z
CO
45 KSI
35 KSI
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Figure 22 Typical Strength vs. Temperature Curve for the
Heat Shield Support Material
The designer must now provide a zero margin of safety for
the most critical of the two design load cases given above. If
FT is the maximum stress for a rectangular cross section of
fixed depth, the designer requires that
c w <
AFnLu
where C is a constant and A is the cross-sectional area of the
beam. Then for
DESIGN LIMIT LOADS: A =
DESIGN OMEGA LOADS: A =
C W
> 0 . 2 6 2 1(T2C
C W
> 0 . 3 5 2 1 0 ~ Z C
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Thus, the Omega Condition is the critical condition, requiring
the larger beam cross section.
If the conventional 1.5 factor of safety were applied to the
Limit Loads, the required area would be 0.283 x 10"2C. Since this
is 20 percent less than that required for the Omega Condition,
failure would occur at a velocity between Limit and Omega. The
probability of exceedance of this failure condition (with 1.5 F.S.)
would be greater than the 10" "* value for the Omega Condition. Thus,
the conventional 1.5 factor of safety would not provide the desired
standard structural reliability.
The general problem associated with a space shuttle entry,
although much more complicated, is basically the same as the illus-
trated problem. For instance, NASA SP-8057 (Reference 2) cur-
rently indicates that the entry trajectories of the shuttle can
be restricted to a nominal trajectory corridor and that the design
may be based on this nominal corridor plus some dispersion. In
the QSDC terminology this design corridor then becomes the Limit
corridor. Similarly, an Omega corridor, reflecting the very rare
excursion out of the Limit corridor, can be defined. Figure 23
indicates the relationships that might exist. Then, for any par-
ticular part of the structure, the requirements of (1) "no" failure
wi'thin the Limit corridor and (2) "most" survive within the Omega
corridor must be met.
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Figure 23. Typical Entry Trajectories
Of course, many of the limiting assumptions on the struc-
tural behavior at elevated temperatures will need to be relaxed
since creep can occur, thermal stress may be present, permanent
degradation of material strength will be present, temperature
distributions may not be uniform, and so on. However, to
account for the temporary loss in strength due to elevated
temperature, the QSDC Procedure can be applied as it stands.
Consideration of more complex problems will require some modi-
fication of the procedure, but the basic philosophy should
carry through.
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4.5 Illustration of Design Condition Definition for Combined
Conditions
The QSDC Procedure handles the problem of combined loads in
much the same manner as the Present System. However, as in the
single load case, a. specific overload requirement is established.
The Present System defines the Limit strength requirement for
combined loads as the ability to sustain all the Limit Loads
simultaneously. The QSDC Procedure defines the Limit strength
requirement in the same manner but with one variation: The Limit
strength requirement for combined loads is defined as the ability
to simultaneously sustain all the Limit Loads which are the re-
sult of the combined operational conditions experienced.
For example, consider the combination of two loads: the
first being the compressive load produced in the "stack" by
the action of the thrust, inertia forces, and aerodynamic drag.
A typical Limit axial load distribution for a shuttle-type
booster might be illustated by Figure 24 where the negative
values shown are compression. The second load considered will
be the tension and compression loads produced by the response
of the structure to a gust encounter. Assume that the gust
occurs during the ascent phase and normal to the flight path
and that the loads are the result of an induced bending moment.
The Limit bending moment as a function of the body station of
the booster is shown in Figure 25.
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Figure 24. Typical Limit and Omega Axial Load Distribution
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Figure 25 Typical Limit and Omega Bending Moment Distribution
for Gust Encounter
For our example, the body station at 1500 inches (hypothetically,
an intertank section) has been determined as the critical station
for the above combined loads. From Figure 24 the axial load
equals 2.1 x 105 pounds compression, and the bending moment from
Figure 25 is 28,000 inch-pounds. The two loads may be combined
to produce the Limit Load for the combination of thrust and gust
encounter. The Limit Load for the combined loading is shown as
the combined Limit spanwise load distribution in Figure 26.
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Figure 26.
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Typical Spanwise Load Distribution at Body Station
1500 for Combined Loads (Present System)
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Note that a zero load requirement exists at point B on the
structure. If the present system were employed here to. define
the overload requirement for tension, the structure would have
no overload capability. (The Present System assumes that the
1.5 FS accounts for the overload condition.) By multiplying the
zero tension requirement by 1.5, the Ultimate Load would still
be zero in tension; hence, there is no increase in capability
and, therefore, no overload capability.
It is recognized that designing for the Limit Load by it-
self is not sufficient. The Present System employs a 1.5 FS to
insure that the strength will be sufficient for the Limit Loads
and to provide for a sufficient overload capability. Similarly,
the QSDC Procedure employs a factor of safety (the LTFS) to in-
sure that the strength will be sufficient for the Limit Loads, but
the overload capability is defined by a separate requirement, that
is, the Omega Condition and its factor of safety, the OTFS. This
method ensures that the overload capability is designed into the
structure, whereas the Present System can only imply a true over-
load capability. The following example will illustrate what
is meant.
Considering the combined Limit Load distribution of Figure
26, the Present System would define the combined Ultimate Load
distribution by multiplying the combined Limit Load distribution
by the 1.5 factor of safety as shown in the figure. Note that the
maximum compressive load (at point A) has a discrete overload
capability (the difference in load from the Limit curve to the
Ultimate curve) and that the minimum compressive load (at point B)
has no overload capability. That is, the zero compressive load
factored by 1.5 is still a zero compressive load; hence, there is
no difference in load and no overload capability. Obviously,
since the vehicle is symmetrical, the maximum compressive load
would provide more than enough overload capability for the minimum
compressive load. However, if the minimum compressive load were
to become a tensile load, there is no coverage of this strength
requirement by the maximum compression load. A tensile load at
point B can result from either a higher bending moment than expected
or a lower thrust loading with the same bending moment. The Present
System, however, cannot consider these overload possibilities by
simply factoring the Limit Loads by the factor of safety to
obtain an "overload" capability.
The QSDC Procedure, however, does consider the overload condi-
tions separately and discretely from the Limit Conditions. (There-
fore, the true overload condition is considered.) The load distri-
bution for the Omega level of thrust and of the condition of gusts
encountered are shown in Figures 24 and 25. A discussion of how
the Omega level of combined conditions is determined can be found
in Section 2.2.2. The spanwise load distribution at the Omega level
of each condition would appear as in Figure 27. The QSDC Procedure
defines the combined Omega Load distribution as follows: The
combined Omega Load distribution for two loads is defined by two
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separate distributions where the Omega Load distribution of one
condition is combined with the Limit Load distribution of the
other. In our example, the combined Omega Load distribution for
the conditions of thrust and gust encountered by a hypothetical
vehicle at station 1500 would be as follows: The spanwise Omega
Load distribution due to the thrust (from Figure 27) is combined
with the spanwise Limit Load distribution due to the gust (from
Figure 26) for the first of the combined Omega Load distributions
(Omega 1, Figure 27). The second combined Omega Load distribution
(Omega 2) is defined as the sum of the spanwise Omega Load distri-
bution due to the gust (Figure 26) and the spanwise Limit Load
distribution due to the thrust (Figure 27). By taking the larger
value of load from either of the Omega Load distributions, the com-
bined Omega Load distribution can be defined. The result of com-
bining the two Omega distributions is a less severe compressive load,
than that of the Present System design (compare point A of the
Omega 1 distribution with the combined Ultimate distribution) and
a small tension requirement where the Present System has none
(point B).
Q
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Figure 27.
BODY SPAN
Typical Spanwise Load Distribution at Body Station
1500 for Combined Loads (QSDC Procedure)
Thus, for the combined load situation, the QSDC Procedure
creates understrength and overload strength requirements as in
the single load situation. However, these strength requirements
are interpreted as two distinct load distributions that must be
sustained by the structure. The load distributions are the
combined Limit Load distribution and the combined Omega Load
distribution.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study (NAS8-26918) is to provide recom-
mendations for improved structural design criteria applicable to
the Space Shuttle. To approach the problem logically, it is neces-
sary to establish the objectives of the structural criteria. It is
generally accepted that the major objective is to define operational
conditions that the vehicle is required to survive without struc-
tural failure. An adjunct to this objective is the specification
of a proof of compliance procedure. This procedure must be accept-
able for demonstrating that the structural system will survive the
defined operational conditions. It is interesting to note that in
NASA SP-8057 (Reference 1*)there is no quantitative definition of
an objective. Neither is there one in MIL-A-8860 (Reference 2).
Reference 3 developed the philosophy of a probabilistically
based, deterministic system for defining structural design criteria.
The concept is propounded that the structural system is expected
to have both the capability of surviving overload situations and a
reserve against understrength situations. Requirements for pro-
viding these two capabilities are identified separately and ex-
plicitly. These requirements are based on probabilistic consider-
ations, but the resulting design conditions are established as
deterministic requirements. This is the key to making the new
procedure practical and administrable.
This report is intended to summarize Reference 3 and together
with Reference 4 describe the application of the Reference 3 con-
cept to the Space Shuttle. To facilitate the understanding and
acceptance of the Reference 3 concept, this report presents the
basics of the concept in the briefest possible form for quick
assimilation. Reference 4 expands the concept and discusses the
rationale in more detail. Reference 5 presents engineering data
and specific procedures for application of the concept to the struc-
tural design of the Space Shuttle and other aerospace vehicles.
* All references in Appendix A relate to listing on page A-20.
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2. GENERAL
This report describes the concepts that define structural
design criteria as developed in Reference 3. For simplicity and
to differentiate from the Present System (typified by the 1.5
Factor of Safety), this new procedure is designated as the QSDC
Procedure (standing for Quantitative Structural Design Criteria
by Probabilistic Methods). Although the QSDC Procedure was de-
veloped for aircraft applications, it is universal and will be
described in this summary in a context appropriate to the Space Shuttle,
The methodology of the QSDC Procedure is presented in this
summary in terms of the intent of the various steps. The imple-
mentation of these intentions is described in detail in Refer-
ences 4 and 5.
All structural failures can be divided into two types:
understrength or overload (see Figure 1). The line of demar-
cation between the two is .somewhat arbitrary. It depends on a
decision defining those environmental conditions which will be
imposed on the structural system by the nonstructural systems
and which the structural system is expected to survive. In the
QSDC Procedure the line of demarcation becomes a zone bounded
by two discrete operational* conditions designated as the Limit
Condition and the Omega Condition. As shown on Figure 2, these
two conditions separate the entire range of severity of a par-
ticular operational condition such as the longitudinal load fac-
tor into three regions :
1. The Safe Region
2. The Overload Region
3. The Gross Overload Region
The Limit Condition is defined as the upper boundary of nor-
mal and expected operations. This definition is considered to be
satisfied in the QSDC Procedure if the Limit Condition is exceeded
only once in one hundred vehicle lifetimes. In the initial design
of a new vehicle such as the Space Shuttle, the decision on the
magnitude of the Limit Condition is made on the basis of a proba-
bilistic prediction of the lifetime operational spectra. If
Hereafter, the environmental conditions which may be im-
posed on the structural system by pilot actions, ground
handling, hydraulic and pneumatic subsystems, aerodynamic
heating and malfunctions will be called operational con-
ditions for simplicity.
This is for what is designated a Standard Vehicle in Refer-
ence 3. Higher or lower values may be used for different
missions but the principle remains unchanged.
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insufficient statistical data are available for a rational cal-
culation of the Limit Condition, the decision is made on a judg-
ment basis with the intent of satisfying the basic definition of
a Limit Condition as the upper boundary of normal and expected
operations.
Once the decision is made, the defined Limit Condition (ini-
tially chosen on a probabilistic basis) is deterministic and is
no longer dependent on the method by which the decision was made.
The choice is made somewhat self-fulfilling by establishing an
Operational Limitation which coincides with the Limit Condition.
Since the Limit Condition by definition is "expected," it and all
lesser conditions are not overloads. Since operations which ex-
ceed the Operational Limitation are .prohibited, any such exceed-
ance is by definition an overload. These definitions are noted in
Figure 2. The definitions of the Limit Condition and the Opera-
tional Limitation are, for all practical purposes, the same as in
the Present System.
The QSDC Procedure defines a second level of operational con-
dition severity that has been designated as the Omega Condition.
This operational condition should be one that will be exce-eded
very rarely, if ever. In the QSDC Procedure the Omega Condition
should be chosen so that the probability of exceedance is less than
the complement of the Structural Reliability Goal. For the Standard
Vehicle previously described, the Structural Reliability Goal is
0.9999, so the probability of exceedance of the Omega Condition
should be less than 0.0001. The same statistical data used for de-
fining the Limit Condition should be used for making the prediction
on which the Omega Condition decision is made. Again, if insuffi-
cient statistical data are available for a rational prediction of
the Omega Condition, the decision is made on a judgment basis.
The choice should define a very rare operational condition. It
should also represent a condition which is obviously a gross
overload as noted on Figure 2, i.e., well beyond the range of
a minor penetration of the designated Operational Limitation.
Finally, the Omega Condition should be one at which structural
failure will be tolerated with the implication that the corrective
action for such a failure will not be to strengthen the structural
system but to change the nonstructural system to prevent future
operations at or beyond the Omega Condition.
The defined Limit and Omega Conditions establish an interface
between the structural and nonstructural systems. Figure 2 and the
previous discussion describe the relationship this interface im-
poses on the nonstructural system. For the structural system, the
Limit Condition represents an operational level below which "no"
structural failure will be tolerated since such operations are
within the Operational Limitation. "Most" of the vehicles should
survive operations to the Omega level without structural failure,
but no vehicles are required to survive beyond the Omega Condition.
Since the Omega Condition is expected to occur once in 10,000
vehicle lifetimes and less severe conditions more often, "most"
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of the structural systems must survive this Omega Condition or
the failure rate will be greater than 1:10000. In such cases
the Structural Reliability Goal of 0.9999 could not be achieved.
The relationship imposed by the Limit/Omega interface on the struc-
tural system is shown on Figure 3. Any failure in the Gross Over-
load Region, beyond the Omega Condition is, by definition, not an
understrength failure. A failure at the Limit Condition is so far
below the intended strength that it is by definition a "gross"
understrength, and the corrective action is predetermined to be an
increase in the strength of the .structural system.
A qualitative description of the characteristics of the three
operational regions delimited by the Limit and Omega Conditions is
presented on Figure 4. In the Safe Region, below the Limit Condi-
tion, all operations are permissible and expected to be "safe"
since they are below the Operational Limitation. Since operations
in this region are expected to be safe, structural failure is not
tolerated at or below the Limit Condition. If a failure does occur,
it is by definition the result of a gross understrength in the struc-
tural system and the responsibility for the failure resides with the
structural system. Operations beyond the Omega Condition in the
Gross Overload Region are not to be tolerated because structural
failure is "expected" in this region. Consequently, any failure
is by definition a gross overload failure and the responsibility of
the nonstructural system that produced the Omega Condition.
The Overload .Region between the Limit and Omega Conditions is
a transitional region. An occasional violation and penetration of
the Operational Limitation will be tolerated, although not approved.
Because a realistic assessment of the situation must recognize
that violations of the Operational Limitations will occur periodi-
cally, some structural capability must be provided to survive these
occasional penetrations into the region beyond the Limit Condition.
This requirement is qualitatively described by stating that most,
but not all, of the structures must survive in this Overload Re-
gion. It should be noted that any penetration of the Operational
Limitation results in an overload, but the magnitude of the overload
varies from a minor overload as soon as the Operational Limitation
is exceeded to a gross overload if the entire region is traversed
and the Omega Condition is attained. In a similar vein, any failure
at less than the Omega Condition represents an understrength situa-
tion which varies from a minor understrength at the Omega Condition
to a gross understrength if failure occurs at the Limit Condition.
Thus, there is a gradual shifting of responsibility for a structural
failure in the Overload Region from the structural system to the
nonstructural system as the level at which the failure occurs in-
creases from the Limit Condition to the Omega Condition.
The requirements for preventing failure in all three regions
are satisfied if four requirements which are related to the Limit
and Omega Conditions and described below are satisfied. As dis-
cussed previously and as shown on Figure 5, the Limit and Omega
Conditions should be chosen and operations controlled so that
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Figure 5. Fault Tree for Structural Failure Prevention
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there are few exceedances of the Limit Condition and very rare
exceedances of the Omega Condition. The strength of the struc-
tural system should range from "no" failure at the Limit Condi-
tion to "most" structural systems capable of surviving the Omega
Condition. If these four separate requirements are satisfied,
the structural failure rate will approximate the frequency of ex-
ceedance of the Omega Condition. In addition, most of the failures
will be the result of gross overloads and only a small percentage
of the failures will be the result of gross understrengths. This
latter objective stems from the fact that past, experience shows
that understrength failures are considered to be less acceptable
than overload failures.
A simple Space Shuttle example which illustrates how these
qualitative requirements are satisfied is presented on Figure 6.
The figure shows the increase in longitudinal load factor with
time (due to a decrease in remaining propellant). This load fac-
tor could increase to such a high value that si significant weight
penalty would be incurred in the design. As a result, present
Space Shuttle designs throttle back the engines to restrict the
longitudinal load factor to some predetermined value, taken to be
3.0G in this example. To define the Limit and Omega Conditions,
an analytical prediction must be made concerning the precision
with which the propulsion control system can establish the nomi-
nal 3.0G on each launch. As shown on Figure 6, the hypothetical
scatter in thrust cutoffs will result in a 3.15G load factor on
1:100. vehicles during their lifetime. A 3.6G load factor is pre-
dicted to occur in 1:10000 vehicle lifetimes. These predictions
may be made by any rational engineering technique. Judgment may
be a major element in the prediction (as it was in this example).
However arrived at, the prediction becomes the basis for the de-
cision that the Limit Condition is 3.15G and the Omega Condition
is 3.6G. From this point on, the Limit/Omega Conditions are de-
te'rministic.
A discussion on. how the decision should be validated is pre-
sented in Reference 4. However, the basic considerations should
be that the propulsion control system and those organizations
responsible for it agree that they can hold the longitudi-
nal load factor to 3..15G "most" of the time and 3.6G "all" of the
time. They and presumably the Program Manager agree that, if the'
load factor exceeds 3.15G on any launch, an investigation will be
initiated to determine the cause of the overload and the necessary
preventative action. Also, the manager of the propulsion control
system and the Program Manager agree in advance that, if the load
factor ever exceeds 3.6G and structural failure follows, the cor-
rective action will be to modify the propulsion control system
rather than to strengthen the structural system.
In short, the decision on the magnitude of the Limit and
Omega Conditions should be based on probabilistic considerations
whenever possible and on good judgement when no data is available.
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The choice is confirmed and accepted by all concerned. From
that time forward any exceedance of the Limit Condition of 3.15G
will be recognizedras an unacceptable operation which overloads
the structural system. Corrective action is promised to prevent
any future penetration into the overload region beyond the 3.15G
Limit Condition. Finally, it is agreed by all concerned that
any operation beyond the 3.6G Omega Condition is expected to re-
sult in structural failure so that prevention of such a gross
overload is a necessity if structural failure in the Gross Overload
Region is to be prevented. .
Once it is decided that the Limit Condition for the longi-
tudinal load factor of the Space Shuttle is 3.15G and that the
Omega Condition is 3.6G, the structural system in each flight
vehicle must satisfy two separate and distinct requirements.
The region below 3.15G must be a safe region as shown on Figure 6
with no structural failure tolerated in this region. Note that
this requirement is valid regardless of the methodology used to
establish the Limit Condition of 3.15G and regardless of whether .
the defined Limit Condition satisfies the specified requirements.
Once the number representing Limit Condition (3.15G) is defini-
tized, that number represents the upper boundary of what must be
safe and permissible operations.
The second requirement for the structural system of each
Space Shuttle is that most of these structural systems should
survive an excursion of boost longitudinal load factor to 3.6G.
Note that in meeting this requirement some capability beyond
Omega is inevitably provided. However, no commitment is estab-
lished to provide any specific level of survival beyond Omega,
provided that "most" survive Omega. The structure is "expected"
to fail in the region beyond Omega. The characteristics ex-
pected of the structural system are summarized on Figure 4.
The structural requirements of "no" failure at Limit and "most"
survive at Omega are provided by two separate strength require-
ments. As shown on Figure 7, a reserve to provide against under-
strength sufficient to cause failure at the Limit Condition is
provided by establishing a Design Load for Limit Condition which
is higher than the load at the Limit Condition. The magnitude
of this reserve
 :will depend on the magnitude of the strength
scatter of the particular structure involved, the number of
strength tests on separate and independent test structures sub-
jected to the Design Load for the Limit Condition, and the risk
level dictated by the vehicle mission. Figure 8 defines a factor
called the Limit Design and Test Factor of Safety (LTFS) which is
sufficient to achieve the desired result.
The rationale of the LTFS is described in detail in Refer-
ence 4. The LTFS is used in the same manner as the 1.5 Factor
of Safety in the Present System. However, the LTFS is determined
by the increment in the test load necessary to reject all under-
strength designs which might result in structural failures during oper
ations at or below the Limit Condition. It is a basic premise of
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the QSDC Procedure that understrength designs have occurred in
the past and may be expected to occur again in the future when
the design strength is predicted by analysis alone.
Strength tests such as static tests of a test article con-
sidered to be representative of the flight articles have been
considered for many years as a major element in the development
of reliable structural systems. The QSDC Procedure continues
this reliance on testing but changes the rationalization for
the test. Most structural engineers have grown accustomed to
thinking that the test "proves" the strength of the design.
This assumption is not correct for reasons discussed in Refer-
ences 3 and 4. The test may be used as a contractual or ad-
ministrative basis for the acceptance of the design, but it does
not prove the strength. In the QSDC Procedure the test is used
as a means for disclosing errors in the analysis. If the test
article fails to support the test loads, the design is rejected.
However, some designs that should be rejected pass the test and
others that should be accepted fail to pass the test.
The problem is that the strengths of a group of nominally
identical structures of a given design are randomly distributed.
The test article may be higher or lower in strength than the
average strength of the flight articles. As a result, a test
article on the low side of the average strength may result in
falsely rejecting a "good" design. This possibility is unfor-
tunate because of the cost and schedule delay involved, but the
redesign for greater strength will result in changing a design
which is already adequate to one which is more reliable than
required. Thus, the impact on the reliability performance of
the structural system would be beneficial.
But if the test article is on the high side of the average
strength, the successful test may result in falsely accepting a
"bad" design. This latter phenomenon is sometimes known as "ran-
dom success." If the strength scatter of the design is small, the
range will be quite narrow between flight articles on the low side
of the scatter band and a possible random success of the test arti-
cle on the high side of the scatter band. Thus, a small LTFS will
be quite adequate to insure a very low possibility of failure under
the load at the Limit Condition after successful test to the higher
design and test load defined by the LTFS.
It appears that the strength scatter of most aerospace struc-
tures designed in the past in accordance with good practice was
small enough so that the usual 1.5 Factor of Safety inherently
provided a more than adequate reserve against understrength; conse-
quently, the problem has not been recognized in the past. Certain
types of designs that were intuitively recognized as having large
scatter (usually vocalized as being inconsistent or erratic in strength)
were proscribed in aerospace practice. Brittle materials such as
ceramics, extremely high heat treats in steels, and welds in
tension were avoided as were very long slender columns. Trends in
structural systems indicate that these types of designs are becoming
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more necessary to meet the demands of advanced systems such as
the Space Shuttle. In such cases an LTFS greater than 1.5 may
be necessary to maintain the desired structural integrity. On
the other hand, the requirement for a low-cost transportation
system such as the Space Shuttle demands that the criteria re-
quirements, be reduced to a minimum to obtain the lightest pos-
sible structural system. The definition of an LTFS in the format
of Figure 8 permits the designer to use an LTFS less than 1.5 if
he can select materials and configurations with a low strength
scatter. When the exigencies of the mission requirements de-
mand structures with a large strength scatter, the larger LTFS
required to provide safety in the region below the Limit Condi-
tion is called out by Figure 8.
As described above and as shown on Figure 8, the reserve
against understrength may be large or small depending on the
structural configuration. The requirement for overload capa-
bility as shown on Figure 7 is separate and distinct from the
requirement for an understrength reserve. There is no factorial
relationship between the Design Load for the Omega Condition and
that for the Limit Condition. For example, the Limit Load for
a vacuum tank designed to operate at sea level would be 14.7
pounds per square inch. Since overpressure could never occur in
this situation, the Omega Load would also be 14.7 pounds per
square inch. The Design Load for the Omega Condition would be
14.7 pounds per square inch, but the Design Load for the Limit
Condition would vary. If the strength scatter were small, the
LTFS might be 1.25 in which case the Design Load for the Limit
Condition would be 18.38 pounds per square inch. If the strength
scatter were large, the LTFS might be 2.1 in which case the Design
Load for the Limit Condition would be 30.87 pounds per square inch,
In either case, the Design Load for the Limit Condition would be
more critical than the Design Load for the Omega Condition. On
the other hand, some overload situations may result in an Omega
Load which is two or three times larger than-the Limit Load. Fur-
ther complicating the problem of providing overload capability is
the variation of temperature and other environmental loads between
Limit and Omega Conditions. It is quite possible that the mechan-
ical load at the Omega Condition may be little more than that for
the Limit Condition; yet the associated thermal environment may
make the Omega Condition much more critical. In any event, the
objective for the structural design is to produce a structural sys-
tem which will survive the Omega Condition in most of the vehicles,
Temperature, radiation, corrosion, and other environments which
occur simultaneous to the Omega Condition must be considered in
determining survival capability.
The final result is a structural system which will possess
an adequate but not excessive provision against the four modes
of failure shown on Figure 5. This in turn will prevent failures
in each of the three operational regions shown on Figure 9, which
combines the definitions of Figures 2 and 3 for easy reference.
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APPENDIX B
ERROR ANALYSIS
B.I Introduction
This appendix is included to give the proper perspective to
the problems created by design errors in the development of a new
piece of hardware such as the Space Shuttle. The design errors
considered are load errors and strength errors. The load errors
considered are errors in the choice of the design condition and
errors in the conversion of operational conditions to external load.
The strength errors considered are the analytical errors made in
sizing and errors in the material strength, such as heat-treat
errors. The impact of these errors on the overall reliability
of the structure is discussed.
The QSDC Procedure, as presented in the report proper and
summarized in Appendix A, is used here. The manner in which the
QSDC Procedure deals with each type of error is also discussed.
The justification of the need to consider the possible errors is
presented briefly according to the Jablecki/Chenoweth data of Fig-
ure B-2 and supplementary data of Figure B-3. These figures are
presented as representative of the true state of the art of analysis
B.2.1 Loads Errors
Load errors are defined as those arising when the exter-
nal loads are not consistent with the design conditions or those
arising when the design conditions, although interpreted correctly
as external loads, are not consistent with the actual mission re-
quirements; that is, either the design condition is right but the
conversion to external loads is incorrect or the choice of the de-
sign condition is in error. An example of the latter would be the
error resulting from ignoring the across-the-fleet variation in
the design condition. Suppose that the maximum gimbal angle de-
flection is specified as 7 degrees. This might be used as a Limit
Condition which may become the design condition (if the loads
associated with the Limit Condition are the more critical). If
the across-the-fleet variation is on the order of one degree, then
the choice of the Limit Condition may be in error by as much as
1.0 degree. Thus, the Limit Condition should be specified as 8.0
degrees. If the loading in the component, say diagonal members of
the thrust structure, is a linear function of the condition inves-
tigated, say gimbal angle, then the design loads for the 7-degree
limit will be less than the loads required for the actual limit of
8.0 degrees. In the QSDC Procedure, this type of error is excluded
because the choice of the Limit and Omega Conditions is made with
consideration of the variability of the condition. The Limit Con-
dition becomes a placard value, that is, it is not to be exceeded.
Exceedances, however, do occur even though it is specified by regu-
lation that it is not to be exceeded. When these exceedances occur
in the pursuit of the design mission, there is evidence that the
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the design condition is too low and hence in error.
The second form of design error is the most common: an
error in the conversion of operating conditions to external
loads. This error is most commonly an analytical one made in
the numerical analysis. For example, suppose that the 8.0-
degree gimbal angle Limit Condition is chosen. Hypothetically,
the loads analysis shows that on some diagonal member in the
thrust structure the load is 50,00'0 pounds compression at this
Limit Condition. The results of operations monitoring might
show that the load on the same member is actually 55,725 pounds
for the Limit Condition of 8 degrees of gimbal. Thus, it
could be said that the interpretation of the Limit Condition as
an external load was in error, although the Limit Condition was
properly chosen.
It should be noted that the loads errors cannot be detected
until the vehicle is in operation and the data from the operations
monitoring has been observed. The exceedance of the placard Limit
in the pursuit of the mission requirements must be detected, and
the external .loads must be measured directly. The condition and
load levels are then correlated. Usually this correlation can be
made during the flight loads program. Due to the placement of
the flight loads program at the beginning of the production phase,
there can be no validation of the loads analysis until the flight
loads program is over. As a result of this time lag, there is a
tendency to be conservative in the loads analysis to compensate
for possible errors.
However, the problems that arise from designing for error
may be worse than the one it is intended to cure. There is the
possibility of either type of error in the loads program creating
schedule delays and cost over-runs, not to mention the resulting
understrength of the structure. In designing for error, a factor
is applied to the load that is possibly in error. Here the re-
sult is higher weight and thus higher cost. The designer's option
is either to ignore the possibility of error in the loads and
suffer the possible schedule delays and the possible increased
cost or to design for the possible error and pay the price of
increased weight and cost. The QSDC Procedure does not ignore
the possibility of loads errors, nor does it design for them.
The fallacy in designing for error is that the magnitude of the .
error cannot be known in advance of its occurrence so that the
factor applied to the load to account for the error is hypothet-
ical at best. In short, the designer is faced with the problem
of how much of an error should the design be accountable for?
Obviously, no specific value can be chosen. For example, the de-
signer might decide to account for possible errors in the design
by using an "error factor" of 2.0. However, if a decimal point
error occurs, this "error factor" would be inadequate. In the QSDC
the assumption of the magnitude of the error is recognized as in-
effective; consequently, the approach is to be aware of the possible
error, monitor the actual operations to detect the possible errors,
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and redesign if they do occur. This is essentially the practice
followed in the Present System.
B.2.2 Strength Errors
Strength errors are defined as those arising when
the strength of the structure is less than the strength required
to survive the design conditions= The strength required to
survive the design conditions will be termed .the conditional
strength. The conditional strength distribution is the distri-
bution predicted as in Figure B-l. The lower strength distribu-
tion is the result of a strength error. An example would be an
error in the dimension of a critical part. Suppose that the
lower fuselage skin is critically loaded in tension. The strength
analysis has shown that a skin thickness of 0.090 inches is suf-
ficient for the design when, in fact, 0.120 inch-sheet is required.
As a result, the strength of the 0.090 fuselage skin will be 25
percent less than that required. Similarily, a missing heat-treat
note will also create an understrength design. After the fabri-
cation of the prototype structure, the existence of the strength
error or understrength design is not known. Unlike the load error,
the strength error can be disclosed with a degree of certainty
by qualification testing to the design loads that characterize
the conditional strength requirement. Thus the qualification
test is a conditional strength test, and the reliability demon-
strated is a conditional reliability as discussed in References
1 and 5.* The conditions on the reliability are:
1) that the external and internal loads in service
are the same 'as the predicted values in design,
2) that the Limit and Omega Conditions are properly
chosen, and
3) that the structure is used in its design mission.
If these conditions are met, then the conditional reliability
will be the actual reliability of the structure in service.
The need for testing for the conditional strength require-
ment has been demonstrated by the Jablecki/Chenoweth data of
Figure B-2. Here, the expectancy of failure, in percent, is
plotted versus the percent of ultimate load supported. This
curve represents the inability of the design analysis to pro-
vide the required strength (100 percent ultimate) for the first
time static tests. The data also represents qualitatively the
ability of the static test to disclose the understrength designs.
More recent in published data, Figure B-3 has shown that there
has been little improvement in the results of the analysis since
the time of the Jablecki/Chenoweth data. These data have been
employed in the computer programs of Reference 1 to define the
probability that the mean strength of the design, as typified
* All references in Appendix B relate to listing on page 76 in
report proper.
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Figure B-2 Jablecki/Chenoweth Data on the Failure of Wing
Structures (Reference 3)
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by the test article, is a percentage of the intended design
strength. Utilizing this information in the calculation of
the reliability of the structure is markedly different from
that of other proposed methods where the reliability is pres-
ently calculated from the interaction of the tails of the load
and strength distributions (Reference 9). In calculating the
reliability in this manner, the assumption is made that the
location of the strength distribution is known. This is not
the real-life situation as evidenced by the Jablecki/Chenoweth
data. The real situation indicates that the reliability is
much more strongly dependent on the possible location of the
actual strength distribution at levels below the predicted
value than on the interaction of the tails of the strength
and load distributions.
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